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vide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a smooth
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is twofold. On the one hand, we present a method to study sto-
chastic differential games which is reminiscent of the Euler–Lagrange equations (EL
henceforth) of the Calculus of Variations problem. On the other hand, we study with
this approach a differential game where N identical agents compete on consumption
of a productive asset, proving the existence and the uniqueness of symmetric equi-
librium. We also analyze some of its main properties. The model we study is also
important in the single-player case, as the game reduces to the one-sector stochastic
growth model analyzed in Bourguignon (1974) and Merton (1975). Despite its sim-
plified nature, this model is fundamental to understand the dynamics of consumption
and capital formation in a one-sector economy where labor supply is affected by an
additive noise. Moreover, in the two-person case, the model is a stochastic version
of the differential game of capitalism introduced by Lancaster (1973), but where the
production factors are fully employed, as in Shimomura (1991).
EL equations are one of the more useful tools to study dynamic optimization prob-
lems. Introduced in the Calculus of Variations for the first time, EL equations have
become a cornerstone in dynamic economic analysis. They provide a first-order opti-
mality condition for interior solutions of dynamic problems, avoiding the use of the
value function. The value function is characterized by the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman
equation (HJB henceforth). HJB equations provide a general characterization of opti-
mality, in the sense that they do not need interiority of the equilibrium to hold.1 Once the
value functions are known, the Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium (MPNE henceforth)
is recovered from the HJB equation as the fixed point of the best response mappings
in the Hamiltonian game.2 It is worth noting that the resolution of the EL equations
provides the solution directly, with no need to compute the value function. In fact, the
value function can be found once the EL equations are solved, as we will show below.
What we propose in this paper is a general method for obtaining EL equations
in a class of stochastic differential games, in which the MPNE is interior, and the
uncertainty, which is modeled as a standard Brownian motion, is independent of the
strategies of the players. This is the most serious limitation of the method developed
in the paper. Nevertheless, many interesting economic models other than those from
finance present this feature as games of Cournot competition with additive noise in
demand, games of dynamic provision of public goods, advertising games, or the non-
cooperative game of exploitation of a productive asset that we study here.
The idea of obtaining the EL equations in a differential game to determine the
MPNE can be traced back to Case (1974), where this author studies a deterministic
differential game of Cournot competition. To find the solution, a system of differ-
ential equations that characterizes the Nash equilibrium is found. This corresponds
to what we call in our paper EL equations. Tsutsui and Mino (1990) also uses the
EL equation to find infinitely many discontinuous MPNE in an oligopolistic differ-
1 EL equations can also be formulated in the general case by introducing multipliers and inequalities instead
of equalities, although obviously in this case, they lose much of their direct applicability.
2 Of course, this program succeeds in continuous time under some technical conditions guaranteeing the
existence of solutions of the corresponding evolution equations.
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ential game. Further concrete applications of the use of the EL equations system in
differential game theory can be found in Shimomura (1991), Dockner and Sorger
(1996), and Sorger (1998), all of them in the deterministic counterpart of the model
we study in this paper. In Rincón-Zapatero et al. (1998) and Rincón-Zapatero (2004),
this approach has been made systematic. These two papers also provide sufficient
conditions of optimality which are independent of the value function. An application
to a general model of exploitation of a nonrenewable resource in a finite horizon is
given. In Martín-Herrán and Rincón-Zapatero (2005), the EL equations are used to
identify games of fishery where the MPNE is Pareto optimal. The subsequent paper
Josa-Fombellida and Rincón-Zapatero (2007) focuses on a stochastic control problem
with Brownian uncertainty, where the players’ decisions cannot affect the size of the
uncertainty.3 The present paper extends this methodology to the game framework. It is
worth commenting on the recent paper Dockner and Wagener (2014), where a similar
approach is used for deterministic games, but based on a differential equation satisfied
by the costate variable in feedback form.
It is well known that the question of existence of equilibria in stochastic differential
games is not satisfactorily addressed by the theory, and, in particular, the development
of this issue is well behind the corresponding theory in continuous stochastic games
with simultaneous moves and discrete time. Amir (1996a) shows, using Topkin’s Theo-
rem and supermodularity, the existence and uniqueness of equilibria in non-symmetric
stochastic games of capital accumulation with a convex transition technology. The
result is applied to a model of altruistic growth in Amir (1996b). In this framework,
Nowak (2006) dispenses the supermodularity condition on the utility function and Bal-
bus et al. (2014) extends these results to allow for more general spaces of strategies,
providing constructive methods to find the equilibrium. All these papers use a powerful
idea in Amir (1996a, 1997), considering convex combinations of transition probabil-
ities. This method of averaging regularizes the best response mapping (or correspon-
dence), enabling the introduction of more regular strategy spaces than those needed
in the deterministic counterpart, see Sundaram (1989). In this way, the Schauder-
Tikhonov fixed point theorem can be invoked to prove existence of equilibrium in the
class of Lipschitz functions. A similar phenomenon happens in continuous time. The
consideration of a continuous Brownian motion as the source of uncertainty has the
effect of regularizing the problem, so that an smooth equilibrium arises (in the symmet-
ric case). This effect is well known in the theory of partial differential equations (PDEs
henceforth): addition of a term involving second derivatives to a first-order equation
(this corresponds to a deterministic problem) leads to higher regularity of the solutions.
Our results of existence and uniqueness are based on classical theorems on PDEs
that cannot be applied directly, but have to be adapted to cover the specificities of the
economic model. What we do is to apply those theorems on bounded subdomains, pro-
viding uniform lower and upper bounds on the solutions. After this, the global solution
3 EL equations were found following the stochastic maximum principle conditions, which is a more general
way than that used here, based on the value function; the second approach has the advantage of simplicity.
In Josa-Fombellida and Rincón-Zapatero (2010), an EL equation of a Mayer problem, where the diffusion
coefficient depends on the control, has been obtained and analyzed. It turns out that the EL equation in this
case is much more complex.
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is obtained after passing to the limit. What is new in our use of the classical theorems is
the following: (1) the transformation of the equation by means of an auxiliary function
that gives the aforementioned bounds and (2) to get these bounds by using the maxi-
mum principle for parabolic PDEs, to obtain these bounds for minimal and maximal
solutions by using the maximum principle for parabolic PDEs and Daskin’s Theorem.
To get sharp bounds of the solution is essential to prove that the solution of the PDE
is also a MPNE, as well as to show the convergence of the finite-horizon MPNE to
the infinite-horizon one. Contrary to the infinite-horizon case, the finite-horizon PDE
is a well-defined Cauchy problem, thus the solution could be computed with standard
PDE algorithms, providing a method to get approximations to the infinite-horizon
equilibrium.
The exploitation of resources under noncooperative management has received much
attention in the literature. The recent survey of Long (2011) provides a modern and
exhaustive account. Origins of the literature can be attached to the seminal contribution
of Levhari and Mirman (1980), where a discrete time version of the game is studied.
They find an explicit solution of the equilibrium when the players have logarithm
utilities. The equilibrium leads to an inefficient allocation of resources since, as a conse-
quence of the noncooperative character of the game, the resource is overexploited. Fur-
ther studies in the field are Clemhout and Wan (1985), Sundaram (1989), Benhabib and
Radner (1992), Dutta and Sundaram (1993a, b), Kamihigashi (2006), Mitra and Roy
(2006), Dockner and Sorger (1996), and Sorger (1998), among others. Of special rele-
vance to us are the two latter papers. Both show that with an infinite horizon, infinitely
many subgame perfect equilibria of the symmetric game exist. All of them are discon-
tinuous with respect to the asset stock level. The reason is the assumption taken with
respect to the elasticity of the marginal utility, which says that it is greater than—Sorger
(1998)—or equal—Dockner and Sorger (1996)—to the ratio N/(N−1), where N is the
number of players.4 The willingness of the players to exchange consumption between
time periods strengthens the fight for the resource and, as we prove, it makes the con-
sumption rate jump to infinite, no matter the resource suffers stochastic fluctuations.
To avoid this problem, the aforementioned papers impose an exogenous upper bound
on the consumption rate. We consider here just the opposite assumption, that is, that
the willingness to exchange consumption across time is strictly less than N/(N − 1).
As in most of the previous literature, we focus on the symmetric game and the sym-
metric Nash equilibrium. Another feature of our study is that we analyze mainly games
with a finite horizon, allowing for rather general bequest functions at the final time.
Then, we show how the finite-horizon equilibrium approaches the infinite-horizon one
as the horizon tends to infinite for an ample class of bequest functions. Finite-horizon
games serve to model problems where access to the fishing pool is valid only for a
fixed period of time; after the time expires, the bequest function of each player could
represent some tax that the owner of the resource imposes on the players for the use
of the resource over the agreed period of time.
We prove the existence and uniqueness of smooth MPNE for the finite-horizon
game, under quite general hypotheses, allowing for the unboundedness of the func-
4 Note that in particular the one-player game never fulfills these assumptions.
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tions intervening in the definition of the problem, as well as non-Lipschitzianity of
the utility function. This is necessary to cover the more popular cases, including those
that allow an analytical resolution. However, no specific functional form is postulated
in our results.
A consequence of the EL equation is a stochastic Keynes–Ramsey rule (KR rule
henceforth) that governs the equilibrium. Due to the stochastic nature of the problem,
the rule consists of a pair of forward–backward stochastic differential equations. In the
single-player deterministic case, the rule was first established for the optimal growth
model analyzed in Ramsey (1928). It characterizes the rate of change of players’
optimal consumption in response to changes in the interest rate and in the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution. In the stochastic case, the expected rate of change in
consumption is much more complex. New terms appear that contain the stochastic
characteristics of the model, as well as the prudence attitude of the players. We find
that a higher prudence index leads to a higher mean increment in consumption. We
also prove a general result on the overall effect of uncertainty and show that under
the standard hypothesis of concavity on the bequest and the recruitment functions, the
larger the uncertainty, the larger the consumption rate of the players. Thus, uncertainty
sharpens competition among players.5 It turns out that the KR rule is very useful in
doing some exercises on comparative statics, studying the effect on the equilibrium
of a variation in the number of players and in the time preference rate.
We also study the curvature of the equilibrium, finding conditions such that the
consumption equilibrium is concave with respect to the state variable. The curvature of
the consumption rule gives us information concerning players’ propensity to consume.
A concave consumption rule implies a higher propensity to consume for poor people
than for rich people. Carroll and Kimball (1996) proved concavity of the consumption
function in a one-player game of finite horizon and discrete time, where uncertainty
comes from three sources: labor income, gross interest rate, and discount factor. The
family of utility functions considered by those authors were of the constant relative
risk aversion class (CRRA henceforth), strictly increasing, concave, and with convex
marginal utility. We consider only one source of uncertainty, but use continuous time
and allow for a rather general bequest function, whereas Carroll and Kimball (1996)
consider no bequest function at the end of the game. We obtain definite results only
for the game we call the linear game, which will be defined below.
Finally, we analyze extinction, that is, whether the competition could lead to an
overexploitation of the resource and eventually drive the resource stock to zero. It is
also worth comparing the stochastic case we deal with here and the deterministic case,
analyzed in Clemhout and Wan (1985). We show that uncertainty raises the possibility
of extinction.
5 Note that this claim has no direct implications for the precautionary savings behavior of players, as the
context is different. Precautionary savings means that the agent saves more today when there is uncertainty
in his/her tomorrow’s income than when the uncertainty is eliminated by adding the expected income to
the wealth process. We do not carry out this exercise here, but compare the Markov equilibrium strategies
of two games with different diffusion coefficients, without modifying the income process (in this case, the
productive asset process). Usually, precautionary savings appear when the marginal utility is convex, which
can be easily proved in two period, discrete time models by means of Jensen’s inequality, see Leland (1968).
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The paper has the following structure. Section 2 contains the definition of a general
stochastic game where player’s actions do no affect the size of uncertainty, as well as the
definition of admissible strategies and of the MPNE. Then comes the deduction of the
EL equation system from the HJB equation. Section 3 presents the game of exploitation
of an stochastic productive asset and the associated EL equations. This section also
contains the basic assumptions we need to attain our results and a characterization of
a family of utility functions that fulfill them. In Sect. 4, we prove the existence and
uniqueness of MPNE in two steps: first, we prove existence and uniqueness—within
a given class of functions—of solution to the EL equation by extending classical
results from the PDE theory to our framework. These technical results are relegated to
“Appendix”; second, we prove that the solution of the PDE is in fact an MPNE of the
game. Some insights into the infinite-horizon game are also provided. Section 5 focuses
on the KR rule, and Sect. 6 is devoted to study some properties of the equilibrium.
Besides the comparative statics of the equilibrium, we obtain a turnpike result and
analyze the question of the extinction of the resource. Finally, some conclusions are
extracted from the paper in Sect. 7. “Appendix” contains the results about PDEs
commented above, as well as other proofs that we consider of a technical character.
2 Description of the game and Euler–Lagrange equations
In this section, we formulate a general stochastic differential game to which the model
studied in the paper is a particular case. Standard references for differential games are
Melhmann (1988), Bas¸ar and Olsder (1999), or Dockner et al. (2000).
We shall use the following notation. The partial derivatives are indicated by sub-
scripts and ∂x stands for total derivation; the partial derivative of a scalar function with
respect to a vector is a column vector; given a real vector function g : Rn −→ Rm
and a vector z ∈ Rn, gz is defined as the matrix (∂gi/∂z j )i, j ; for a matrix A, A(i)
denotes the i th column and Ai j denotes the (i, j) element; vectors v ∈ Rn are column
vectors and vi is the i th component;  denotes transposition.
We consider an N -person differential game over a fixed and bounded time interval
[0, T ] with 0 < T ≤ ∞. Let (Ω,F , P) be a complete probability space. Assume
that on this space, a d-dimensional Brownian motion {w(t),Ft }t∈[0,T ] is defined with
{Ft }t∈[0,T ] being the Brownian filtration. Let E denote expectation under the proba-
bility measure P. We also consider the function space L2F ([0, T ];Rn) of all processes
X (·) with values in Rn adapted to filtration {Ft }t≥0 such that E
∫ T
0 ‖X (t)‖2 dt < ∞.
The state space is a subset X ⊆ Rn and the set of admissible profiles of the
players is some subset U = U 1 × U 2 × · · · × U N , where Ui ⊆ Rmi , with6 mi =
n, for all i = 1, . . . , N . A U—valued process of strategic profiles {(u(s);Fs) =
((u1(s), u2(s), . . . , uN (s));Fs)} defined on [t, T ] × Ω is an Fs—progressively
measurable map (r, ω) → u(r, ω) from [t, s]×Ω into U , that is, u(t, ω) is Bs×Fs—
measurable for each s ∈ [t, T ], where Bs denotes the Borel σ—field in [t, s]. For
simplicity, we will denote u(t, ω) by u(t).
6 The case mi > n could also be analyzed, by means of a reduction to the case mi = n as in Josa-Fombellida
and Rincón-Zapatero (2007).
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The state process X ∈ Rn satisfies the system of controlled stochastic differential
equations (SDEs henceforth)
d X (s) = f (s, X (s), u(s)) ds + σ(s, X (s)) dw(s), t ≤ s ≤ T, (1)
with initial condition X (t) = x, t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ Rn . Observe that the diffusion
coefficient, σ , is independent of the control variable, u. The functions f :[0, T ] ×
R
n × U −→ Rn and σ :[0, T ] × Rn −→ Rn×d are both assumed to be of class C2
with respect to (x, u) and of class C1 with respect to t . Since our aim is to work with
the MPNE concept, we will consider the game for every initial condition (t, x).
Definition 1 (Admissible strategies) A strategic profile
{(u(t);Ft )}t∈[0,T ] = {((u1(t), u2(t), . . . , uN (t));Ft )}t∈[0,T ] is called admissible if
(i) for every (t, x) the system of SDEs (1) with initial condition X (t) = x admits a
pathwise unique strong solution;
(ii) for each i = 1, . . . , N , there exists some function φi :[0, T ] × Rn −→ Ui of
class C1,2 with respect to (t, x) such that ui is in relative feedback to φi , i.e.
ui (s) = φi (s, X (s)) for every s ∈ [0, T ].
Let U i (t, x) denote the set of admissible strategies of player i and U = U1 ×· · ·×U N
the set of admissible strategies profiles, corresponding to the initial condition (t, x) ∈
[0, T ] × Rn .
Part (ii) in Definition 1 means that players use Markov strategies. When φi is time
independent, we will say that the strategy is a stationary Markovian strategy.
The instantaneous utility function of player i is denoted by Li and his or her bequest
function by Si . Given initial conditions (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×Rn and an admissible strategic
profile u, the payoff function of each player (to be maximized) is given by
J i (t, x; u) = Et x
{∫ T
t
e−ri (s−t) Li (s, X (s), u(s)) ds + e−ri (T−t)Si (T, X (T ))
}
,
where Et x denotes conditional expectation with respect to the initial condition (t, x).
In the following, the subscript will be eliminated if there is no confusion. The functions
Li :[0, T ] × Rn × U −→ R and Si :[0, T ] × Rn −→ R, i = 1, . . . , N , are both of
class C2 with respect to (x, u) and of class C1 with respect to t . The constant ri ≥ 0
is the rate of discount. J i (t, x; u) denotes the utility obtained by player i when the
game starts at (t, x) and the profile of strategies is u. Given that our aim is to solve the
problem for every (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn,U will often be written instead of U(t, x).
In the infinite-horizon case, the bequest functions Si are null. In this case, if the
problem is autonomous and the strategies are Markov stationary, the value function is
independent of time, and the initial condition is simply x .
In a noncooperative setting, the aim of the players is to maximize their individual
payoff J i . Since this aspiration depends on the strategies selected by the other players
also, it is generally impossible to attain7. An adequate concept of solution is Nash equi-
7 But in some models, the MPNE is also Pareto optimal; see Martín-Herrán and Rincón-Zapatero (2005).
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librium, which prevents unilateral deviations of the players from its recommendation
of play.
Definition 2 (MPNE) An N -tuple of strategies φ̂ ∈ U is called a Markov Perfect
Nash Equilibrium if for every (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn , for every φi ∈ U i
J i (t, x; (φi |φ̂−i )) ≤ J i (t, x; φ̂),
for all i = 1, . . . , N .
In the above definition, (φi |φ̂−i ) denotes (φ̂1, . . . , φ̂i−1, φi , φ̂i−1, . . . , φ̂N ). Note that
with an MPNE, no player has incentives to deviate unilaterally from the equilibrium,
whatever the initial condition (t, x) is.
Definition 3 (Value functions) Let φ̂ be an MPNE of the game. The value function
V i of the i th player is
V i (t, x) = sup
φi ∈U i
{
J i (t, x; (φi |φ̂−i )) : d X (s) = f (s, X (s), (φi |φ̂−i )(s, X (s))) ds
+ σ(s, X (s)) dw(s), X (t) = x, ∀s ∈ [t, T ]
}
,
for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn , for all i = 1, . . . , N .
Theorem 1 (Euler–Lagrange equations) Suppose that for all i = 1, . . . , N , V i and
φi are of class C1,2, that V ixt = V itx and that φi is interior to the control region Ui .
Then (φ1, . . . , φN ) satisfy the system of PDEs
riΛ
i (t, x, φ) = ∂
∂t
Λi (t, x, φ) + ∂
∂x
Hi (t, x, φ,Λi (t, x, φ))
+ 1
2
∂
∂x
Tr
(
σσ ∂
∂x
Λi (t, x, φ)
)
, (2)
with final conditions φi (T, x) = ϕi (x) given implicitly by
Li
ui
(T, x, ϕ1(x), . . . , ϕN (x)) + Six (T, x) fui (T, x, ϕ1(x), . . . , ϕN (x)) = 0, (3)
for i = 1, . . . , N.
Proof The smoothness of the value functions of the players guarantee that they satisfy
the HJB equations with terminal conditions
ri V i (s, x) = V it (s, x) + max
ui ∈Ui
Hi (s, x, (ui |φ−i ), V ix (s, x)) +
1
2
Tr(σσV ixx )(s, x),
V i (T, x) = Si (T, x), t ≤ s ≤ T, (4)
where Hi is the Hamiltonian of player i
Hi (s, x, u, λi ) = Li (s, x, u) + (λi ) f (s, x, u).
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Since the MPNE is interior to U = U 1 × · · · × U N , the maximization condition
max
ui ∈Ui
Hi (t, x, (ui |φ−i ), V ix ), i = 1, . . . , N
turns into
Li
ui
(s, x, (φi |φ−i )) + fui (s, x, (φi |φ−i ))V ix = 0, i = 1, . . . , N
which is explicitly solvable for V ix = Λi (s, x, φ) := f −ui Liui (t, x, φ), supposing
f iu to be invertible for all i . The above equality also holds at time t = T . Since
V (T, x) = S(x), Vx (T, x) = S′(x). Plugging this value into the equality, we get the
final condition (3). On the other hand, by the envelope theorem, for each j = 1, . . . , n
we obtain
ri V ix j (t, x) = V ix j t (t, x) +
∂
∂x j
Hi (t, x, φ, V ix (t, x)) +
1
2
∂
∂x j
Tr(σσV ixx (t, x)).
Substituting now V ix = Λi (t, x, φ) we get for the MPNE φ = (φ1, . . . , φN ) the EL
system of equations of differential type given in (2). unionsq
Notice that ∂/∂x denotes total differential with respect to x . No explicit dependence
of the value functions appears, as in the EL equations in discrete dynamic program-
ming.
3 Competition for consumption of a stochastic productive asset: game,
assumptions, and Euler–Lagrange equations
3.1 The game
We consider a continuous time noncooperative game where N agents consume a
stochastic productive asset. Asset stock at time t ≥ 0 is denoted by X (t) and
the consumption rate of player i ∈ {1, . . . , N }, denoted ci (t), is given through
a Markov strategy φi :[0, T ] × [0,∞) −→ [0,∞), that is, ci (t) = φi (t, X (t)).8
Given a consumption profile of Markov strategies of the other players, φ−i =
(φ1, . . . , φi−1, φi+1, . . . , φN ), player i chooses consumption ci ≥ 0 to maximize
his/her payoff
Ji (t, x, φ−i ; ci ) = Et x
∫ T
t
e−ri (s−t)Li (ci (s)) ds + e−ri (T−t)Et x Si (X (T )).
This is given by the expected total utility of consumption, Li (ci ), over a fixed time
horizon [0, T ], plus the utility derived from the asset stock at the end of the period,
8 The game is a particular case of the general framework described in Sect. 2 above. The class of admissible
strategies is given in Definition 1.
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Si , both discounted at the rate r i > 0. The utility Li could be equal to sale revenue,
Li (ui ) = ui pi (ui ), where pi is an inverse demand function. The bequest function Si
reflects the fact that the asset has externality effects over the players. The asset stock
must satisfy X (s) ≥ 0 almost surely (a.s.) for all s. Some of the assumptions listed
below guarantee that both constraints ci (s) ≥ 0 and X (s) ≥ 0 a.s. for all s are satisfied
in equilibrium. The asset evolves according to the SDE
d X (s) =
⎛
⎝F(X (s)) − ci −
∑
j =i
φ j (s, X (s))
⎞
⎠ ds + σ(X (s))dw(s), (5)
where w is a standard Brownian motion defined on a complete probabilistic space
(Ω,F, P). We will denote by Et x the conditional expectation with respect to the initial
condition (t, x) under the probability measure P, where x = X (t) > 0. The asset stock
reproduces at the rate given by the production/recruitment function F , which may be
a natural growth function describing the dynamics of a renewable resource, such as a
fish population. In this case, it is common to consider F with a maximum sustainable
yield and with a maximum carrying capacity. We do not restrict ourselves to this case.
The evolution of the asset is affected by stochastic fluctuations given by the diffusion
term σ(X (s)). The uncertainty may come from inaccurate estimation of the resource
reserves, which need to be continuously updated by the players. The game is widely
used in the design of optimal harvest rules in stochastic fisheries under competition.
Conrad (2012) uses this model to measure the effect of competition on the welfare of
the players and carries out a calibration with real data and five players, finding that
the predictions of the model are consistent with reality.
3.2 The Euler–Lagrange equations
The starting point of our approach to the game is the system of EL Eq. (2) given in
Theorem 1. Let ϕi = (L ′i )−1 ◦ S′i , i = 1, . . . , N , that defines the optimal strategy of
player i at the end of the game. In the following lemma, the symbols ∂t , ∂x , denote
total derivative with respect to t, x ; details are given in Sect. 2 above.
Lemma 1 Suppose that the functions defining the game are twice continuously differ-
entiable. Then a MPNE given by Markov strategies φ = (φ1, . . . , φN ) of class C1,2
satisfies the following system of EL equations:
ri L ′i (φi (t, x)) = ∂t L ′i (φi (t, x))
+ ∂x
(
Hi (x, φ(t, x), L ′i (φi (t, x)))+
1
2
σ 2(x)∂x L ′i (φi (t, x))
)
(6)
for i = 1, . . . , N, with final value
φi (T, x) = ϕi (x), x > 0 (7)
and boundary condition
φi (t, 0) = 0, ∀t ≤ T . (8)
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Proof To obtain the EL equations, consider the current adjoint function and the current
Hamiltonian of each player:
Adjoint function: Λi (x, (ci |c−i )) = L ′i (ci ),
Hamiltonian: Hi (x, (ci |c−i ), λi ) = Li (ci ) +
⎛
⎝F(x) − ci −
∑
j =i
c j (s)
⎞
⎠ λi .
Now we apply Theorem 1 to obtain the EL Eq. (6) and final condition (7). The boundary
condition (8) is a requirement imposed by feasibility. unionsq
In the infinite-horizon case, the EL equation system is still (6), but there is no ter-
minal condition (7). For stationary Markov strategies the term ∂t L ′i = L ′′i φit vanishes.
Condition (8) becomes φi (0) = 0.
Let Ri = −L ′i/L ′′i be the absolute risk tolerance index (the inverse of the absolute
risk aversion index of Arrow–Prat) and Pi = −L ′′′i /L ′′i be the absolute prudence index
of player i as defined in Kimball (1990). Taking total derivatives in (6) we get, for
i = 1, . . . , N
φit (t, x) +
⎛
⎝F(x) −
N∑
j=1
φ j (t, x) + σ ′(x)σ (x)
⎞
⎠φix (t, x) −
1
2
σ(x)2 Pi (φi (t, x))(φix (t, x))
2
+1
2
σ(x)2φixx (t, x) + Ri (φi (t, x))
⎛
⎝ri − F ′(x) +
∑
j =i
φ
j
x (t, x)
⎞
⎠ = 0. (9)
In the rest of the paper, we center on the symmetric game and on the symmetric
MPNE. Thus, for all i = 1, . . . , N ,
Li = L , Si = S, ri = r
and hence we will drop the index in the functions defined above. The symmetry
condition leads to the same risk tolerance and same prudence indexes for each player,
Ri = R and Pi = P for any i , as well as the same terminal value at time T, ϕi = ϕ.
Under this assumption, the symmetric MPNE leads, after rearrangement of (9), to the
single EL equation
φt (t, x) +
(
F(x) − Nφ(t, x) + (N − 1)R(φ(t, x)) + σ ′(x)σ (x)
)
φx (t, x)
− 1
2
σ(x)2 P(φ(t, x))φx (t, x)2 + 12σ(x)
2φxx (t, x) + R(φ)(r − F ′(x)) = 0,
(10)
with final and boundary conditions
φ(T, x) = ϕ(x) = (L ′)−1(S′(x)), x > 0,
φ(t, 0) = 0, t < T, (11)
respectively.
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Let ρ(c) = R(c)/c be the elasticity of intertemporal substitution for riskless con-
sumption paths and π(c) = P(c)c the relative prudence index.
3.3 Assumptions
To get our results of existence and uniqueness of a symmetric MPNE of the game, we
need to impose several assumptions. They are justified after they are stated.
(A1) Functions L , S, F and σ are continuous in [0,∞), with L(0) = F(0) = σ(0) =
0, σ (x) > 0 for x > 0. Function L is of class C6 and S, F and σ are of class
C4 in (0,∞). Moreover, both F ′ and σ ′ are bounded in (0,∞).
(A2) The instantaneous utility function L is strictly concave, with L ′′′ ≥ 0 and
R(0) = 0.
(A3) (a) There exist constants 0 ≤ ρ− ≤ ρ+ < NN−1 such that
ρ− ≤ ρ(c) ≤ ρ+ for all c ≥ 0.
(b) There exist constants 0 ≤ π− ≤ π+ such that
π− ≤ π(c) ≤ π+ for all c > 0.
(A4) Function ϕ satisfies ϕ(0) = 0 and ϕ(x) > 0 for x > 0.
(A5) There is a function f , continuous in [0,∞) and of class C4 in (0,∞) with f ′
bounded, satisfying f (x) > 0 for x > 0 such that
(a) f ′(0+) = limx→0+ f (x)/x exists and is finite.
(b) The function ϕ0 = ϕ/ f satisfies
M ≡ sup
x∈[0,∞)
ϕ0(x) < ∞, m ≡ inf
x∈[0,∞) ϕ0(x) > 0.
(c) For x > 0, let
γ +(x) = max{ρ−(r − F ′(x)), ρ+(r − F ′(x))},
γ −(x) = min{ρ−(r − F ′(x)), ρ+(r − F ′(x))}
and let
β+(x) = (F(x) + σ ′(x)σ (x))
( f ′(x)
f (x)
)
+ 1
2
σ 2(x)
( f ′′(x)
f (x)
)
− π
−
2
σ 2(x)
( f ′(x)
f (x)
)2
+ γ +(x),
β−(x) = (F(x) + σ ′(x)σ (x))
( f ′(x)
f (x)
)
+ 1
2
σ 2(x)
( f ′′(x)
f (x)
)
− π
+
2
σ 2(x)
( f ′(x)
f (x)
)2
+ γ −(x).
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We assume that
−∞ < β− ≡ inf
x∈[0,∞) β
−(x), β+ ≡ sup
x∈[0,∞)
β+(x) < ∞.
We will say that a function f satisfying this assumption is a limiting function for the
equilibrium.
Let us explain the assumptions.
– Assumption (A1) establishes the required smoothness of the data to apply our
results and imposes finite marginal productivity at 0 and at +∞. Concavity of F
is not needed. Note that (A1) implies the existence of constants A and σ such
that −Ax ≤ F(x) ≤ Ax and 0 ≤ σ(x) ≤ σ x , for all x ≥ 0. Hence, production
functions with F ′(0+) = +∞ are excluded. This is the same assumption as in
Foldes (2001).
– Assumption (A2) imposes strict concavity of the instantaneous utility L , a standard
property that seems to be unavoidable for the existence of an interior and smooth
equilibrium. The assumption L ′′′ ≥ 0 is typical in consumer theory and, for a
concave utility L , it implies a positive prudence index. Consumers with a positive
prudence index tend to make extra savings in the present date due to future income
being random, a behavior known as precautionary savings. The condition R(0) = 0
guarantees that the solution of the EL equation is non-negative.
– Assumption (A3) is key for proving existence of a smooth solution of the EL Eq.
(10) and boundary conditions (11), and allows us to get convergence of the finite-
horizon approximations to the solution of the infinite-horizon case with constant
relative risk aversion instantaneous utility (CRRA henceforth). It assumes that
both the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and the relative prudence index are
bounded. However, we allow for unbounded utility functions L . In particular, the
CRRA utility case is covered in our framework, as in the linear game defined below.
Condition (a) means that the willingness of the players to substitute consumption
across time is bounded by the ratio N/(N − 1), which depends on the number of
players. As will be shown in Corollary 1 below, this condition cannot be relaxed
if one seeks for interior and smooth equilibria, since it prevents the blow up of
the solution of the EL Eq. (10) in finite time. The upper bound decreases as N
increases. In the limit when N → ∞, it becomes 1, but in the other extreme
case with only one player, it places no constraint. Note that while we consider
the stochastic game with ρ(c) < N/(N − 1), Dockner and Sorger (1996) studied
the deterministic game with utility L(c) = √c and two players, where ρ(c) =
N/(N − 1) = 2 for all c, leading to a continuum of symmetric discontinuous
MPNE in the game with infinite horizon. Sorger (1998) attains the same result for
more general utility functions satisfying ρ(c) ≥ N/(N − 1). In both cases, the
equilibrium exists due to the imposition of an upper bound in the consumption
rate. The MPNE prescribes consumption at the maximal allowed rate for high
enough values of the resource stock, so that the equilibrium is no longer interior.
We study here the case left aside in the aforementioned references, in a stochastic
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environment.
– Assumption (A4) takes care of feasibility: it establishes that, at the final time T ,
consumption is positive as soon as there is something to consume, φ(T, x) > 0 if
x > 0, and that it is feasible, φ(T, 0) = 0.
– Assumption (A5) is a way to generalize our results including in our analysis games
with the unbounded bequest function S, the production function F , and the dif-
fusion coefficient σ . The selection of a given f will depend on the form of these
functions. Moreover, it provides lower and upper estimates for the consumption
rule. The role of the constants β+ and β− will be made clear in the proof of
the theorem of the existence of smooth solutions of the EL equation, given in
“Appendix.”
We now introduce new notation that will be used throughout the paper
α+ = ρ+(N − 1) − N , α− = ρ−(N − 1) − N . (12)
Assumption (A3) (a) implies that α+ < 0.
We illustrate the above assumptions in a particular game, that we will call the linear
game with CRRA instantaneous utility, or simply the linear game, which is defined
now for further reference.
Definition 4 The linear game corresponds to a CRRA instantaneous utility
L(c) = c
1−δ
1 − δ , if 0 < δ < 1,
where both F and σ are linear, F(x) = Ax, σ (x) = σ x , for some constants A ≥
0, σ > 0.
Note that no specific functional form is imposed on the bequest function S. Linear
production functions appear in endogenous growth models, where they are known
as AK-models. We will use the linear game as a touchstone to illustrate the results
obtained along the paper.
For the linear game, f (x) = x is an adequate selection as a limiting function
whenever the bequest value S satisfies, in accordance with Assumption (A4) S′(0+) =
∞ and S′(x) > 0 for x > 0, and ϕ(x) = S′(x)−1/δ satisfies Assumption (A5), that is
inf
x>0
S′(x)−1/δ
x
> 0, sup
x>0
S′(x)−1/δ
x
< ∞.
The remaining elements are R(c) = c
δ
, P(c) = 1+δ
c
, ρ(c) = 1
δ
and π(c) = 1 + δ,
and the several constants defined above are
ρ ≡ ρ− = ρ+ = 1
δ
,
π ≡ π− = π+ = 1 + δ,
α ≡ α+ = α− = (N − 1)/δ − N < 0 iff δ > 1 − 1/N ,
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β ≡ β− = β+ = A + σ
2
2
(1 − δ) + r − A
δ
.
3.4 A class of utility functions satisfying the standing hypotheses
There are many utility functions L other than in the CRRA class that satisfy assump-
tions (A1–A3). We are specially interested in the class of utility functions with relative
risk-seeking index given by
ρ(c) = ψ1c
θ + μ1
ψ2cθ + μ2 , ψ1, ψ2, μ1, μ2 > 0. (13)
The parameter θ is arbitrary, but θ = 0 leads to a constant ρ and thus, to the CRRA
class. Our aim is to show a wider class of admissible utility functions that still have
both ρ and π bounded. The case θ < 0 is a mirror case of θ > 0, exchanging the roles
of the constants, since
ρ(c) = ψ1 + μ1c
−θ
ψ2 + μ2c−θ , −θ > 0.
Hence, the results below are established only for θ > 0. Moreover, if Δ ≡ ψ1μ2 −
ψ2μ1 = 0, then ρ = μ1/μ2, leading to the CRRA class again, thus we assume Δ = 0.
It is clear thatρ is bounded, since it is continuous in [0,∞) and limc→∞ ρ(c) = ψ1/ψ2
exists and is finite. In fact, the sign of ρ′ is the sign of Δ, thus ρ is monotonous
increasing or decreasing, and hence ρ is bounded between the values μ1/μ2 and
ψ1/ψ2. We will assume Δ > 0. Moreover, π is also bounded. To show this claim,
note that9 ρ′c + ρ = −1 + ρπ , hence solving for π one gets
π(c) = 1 + 1
ρ(c)
+ cρ
′(c)
ρ(c)
.
The summand 1 + 1
ρ(c)
is bounded. The other summand equals
θΔcθ
(ψ1cθ + μ1)(ψ2cθ + μ2) ,
which is continuous in c and with limit θΔ
ψ1ψ2
as c → ∞. Thus, π is bounded. In fact,
the function z −→ z
(ψ1z+μ1)(ψ2z+μ2) attains a global maximum at z
∗ =
√
μ1μ2
ψ1ψ2
. The
explicit bounds for both ρ and π , under the assumption Δ > 0, are
9 This relationship between ρ and π is general and follows from the identity R′ = −1 + R P and the
definitions of ρ and π .
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ρ+ = max
{
ψ1
ψ2
,
μ1
μ2
}
,
ρ− = min
{
ψ1
ψ2
,
μ1
μ2
}
,
π+ = 1 + 1
ρ−
+ θΔz
∗
(ψ1z∗ + μ1)(ψ2z∗ + μ2) ,
π− = 1 + 1
ρ+
.
In the following proposition, uniqueness means modulo multiplication and addition
of constants.
Proposition 1 Let us assume that θ > 0,Δ > 0 and μ2 < μ1. Then there exists a
unique utility function L that satisfies assumptions (A1–A3) and that has ρ as given
in (13). The marginal utility is given by
L ′(c) = c−
μ2
μ1 (ψ1c
θ + μ1)
Δ
ψ1μ1θ . (14)
Proof By the comments and assumptions made before the proposition, both ρ and
π are bounded. Note that L ′ defined in the proposition is infinitely differentiable
in (0,∞) and positive. Let L(c) = ∫ c0+ L ′(z)dz, c > 0. The definition is right, as
this improper integral is convergent under the assumption μ2 < μ1. This is because
∫ 1
0+ c
−μ2
μ1 dc is convergent and
lim
c→0+
c
μ2
μ1 L ′(c) < ∞,
thus the comparison criterium leads to the claim. Moreover, L(0) = 0 and L is smooth
in (0,∞). Starting from (14) it is easy to calculate L ′′, that is negative (and thus L
strictly concave), as well as to check that ρ is given by (13). The assumption Δ > 0
implies that L ′′′ > 0 as well. unionsq
We have not been able to find the explicit form of L . But to have an specific
functional form is only for convenience, as the important characteristics of a consumer
are given by the marginal utility and the attitude toward risk. They are the only pieces
of information we need to proceed with our investigations.
It is also clear that if, for instance, we postulate an utility function L with
L ′(c) = c−δ(Dcθ + E)ξ (15)
and δ, θ, ξ, D, E > 0, δ < 1, then the associated ρ is of the form given in (13) after
a suitable identification of the constants ψ1, ψ2, μ1, μ2 in terms of δ, D, E, ξ . It is
ψ1 = D,
μ1 = E,
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ψ2 = D(δ − θξ),
μ2 = δE,
with θξ < δ to ensure ψ2 > 0. Also note that Δ = DEθξ > 0. For this function
L , ρ+ = 1
δ−θξ and α
+ = ρ+(N − 1) − N < 0 holds for N < 11−(δ−θξ) , where α+ is
defined in (12). This condition is fundamental in Theorem 2 below about existence of
solutions of the PDE.
We will need for Sect. 5 a further characterization, that consists in isolating, within
this class of utility functions, a subclass such that ρ and π show a linear tradeoff,
π = b − aρ, a, b > 0. This means that increasing the elasticity of substitution one
unit is only possible at the expense of decreasing the relative prudence index a units.
Proposition 2 Let ρ be as given in (13). Then, π = b − aρ if and only if
Δ = ψ1μ1θ, (16)
and the constants a, b are given by
a = ψ2μ2
ψ1μ1
, (17)
b = 1 + ψ2
ψ1
+ μ2
μ1
. (18)
Proof Given ρ, we compute L ′ as in Proposition 1 and then π . The sufficient part is
easily checked by substitution. For the necessary part, by imposing π − b + aρ = 0
for unknown positive constants a, b, three equations have to be fulfilled
a
(
ψ1
ψ2
)2
+ (1 − b)
(
ψ1
ψ2
)
+ 1 = 0,
a
(
μ1
μ2
)2
+ (1 − b)
(
μ1
μ2
)
+ 1 = 0,
2aψ1μ1 + (1 − b)(ψ1μ2 + μ1ψ2) + Δθ + 2ψ2μ2 = 0. (19)
The two first equations say that the parabola aη2 + (1−b)η+1 has positive solutions
ψ1/ψ2 and μ1/μ2. From this, one easily gets the sum and the product of roots
b − 1
a
= ψ1
ψ2
+ μ1
μ2
,
1
a
= ψ1
ψ2
μ1
μ2
.
From the second equation, we get (17). Plugging this value into the first equation above
we get (18). Now, using (19), and after some manipulations, the compatibility condition
(16) arises. Finally, note that b > 1 as well as (1 − b)2 − 4a =
(
ψ2
ψ1
− μ2
μ1
)2
> 0. unionsq
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Continuing with example (15), L shows a linear relationship between ρ and π if and
only if Δ = DEθξ = DEθ = ψ1μ1θ , that is, ξ = 1. Hence L ′(c) = x−δ(Dxθ + E)
and then L is the sum of two CRRA utilities.
We wish to establish the converse of Proposition 2. We need the following lemma,
that will be also used in Sect. 5 below.
Lemma 2 Let the general Riccati differential equation cρ′(c) = −aρ2+(b−1)ρ−1,
where a, b > 0 are constants such (b−1)2 >4a and b>1. Then the general solution
is
ρ(c) = ηK c
θ + 1
ηθ
K cθ + a
θ
, (20)
where θ = 2aη − b + 1 > 0, η > 0 is the bigger solution of aη2 + (1 − b)η + 1 = 0,
and K > 0 is arbitrary.
Proof According to Polyanin and Zaitsev (1995, eqn. 1.2.2.22), after taking z = cb−1
and y = ρc1−b, the ODE transforms into the special Riccati equation y′(z) = a1−b y2+
1
1−b z
−2
. The general solution of this equation is, again following Polyanin and Zaitsev
(1995, eqn. 1.2.2.36)
y(z) = η
z
− z
2 a1−b η
a
1−b z
2 a1−b η+1 z
2 a1−b η + K
,
where K is an arbitrary constant and η is solution of the quadratic equation aη2 +
(1 − b)η + 1 = 0. Now, turning back to the original variables, we obtain
ρ(c) = η − c
−2aη+b−1
a
1−b
2 a1−b η+1 c
−2aη+b−1 + K
.
Manipulating this expression, and using the definition of θ and ofη, it is straightforward
to get (20). Finally, the assumptions done imply that η > 0 exists and that θ > 0,
since
– The quadratic equation admits the positive solution η = (b − 1)/2a +√
(b − 1)2 − 4a/2a.
– θ > 0 is equivalent to η > (b − 1)/2a, which is true by the item above. unionsq
Looking at (13) and at (20), the following identification of parameters follows
θ = 2aη − b + 1,
ψ1 = ηK ,
μ1 = 1
ηθ
, (21)
ψ2 = K ,
μ2 = a
θ
.
Of course, (16), (17) and (18) hold.
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Proposition 3 Let L be a three-time differentiable utility function such thatπ = b−aρ
for some constants a, b > 0, where b > 1 and (b − 1)2 > 4a. Let η be the larger
solution of the quadratic equation aη2 + (1−b)η+1 = 0. Then associated ρ is given
by (13), with parameters given in (21). If L(0) = 0, then aη < 1 holds.
Proof It is consequence of the previous lemma. All the parameters are positive and
Δ = K
ηθ
(aη2 − 1) = K > 0 by assumption, since ηθ = aη2 − 1, by definition of η
and θ . When L(0) = 0, the improper integral ∫ c0 L ′(z)dz is convergent, see the proof
of Proposition 1. This implies that μ2 < μ1, which is aη < 1. unionsq
4 Existence of a symmetric MPNE
In the following results, we will suppose that the assumptions imposed in the above
section hold. To show existence of an MPNE, we proceed in two steps. First, we
establish a result about the existence of a solution to the EL equation, providing at the
same time upper and lower bounds for the solution. In a second step, we will prove
that under suitable additional conditions, the solution qualifies as an MPNE of the
symmetric game. The consideration of a limiting function f in the estimates found for
the solution of the EL equation in the next result allows us to drop the boundedness
hypothesis that is commonly assumed in the PDE literature. Boundedness is a severe
limiting assumption in economic models, since it eliminates CRRA utility functions
and linear production functions from the analysis, even though they are by far the
more popular and widely used in applications. Our approach will be useful in proving
that solutions of the EL equation are in fact an MPNE of the game for a wide range
of utility and production functions, as well as in analyzing the turnpike properties of
the finite-horizon MPNE.
4.1 Existence of smooth solutions to the Euler–Lagrange equation
The proof of the theorem below uses classical results of existence of solution to PDEs,
adapted to our framework with unbounded functions and unbounded state space. For
this reason (unboundedness), those results cannot be applied directly, so we combine
them with an approach that uses the maximum and minimum values of solutions
existing in finite time and bounded intervals of the state space. These solutions provide
upper and lower estimates for the solution that prevent the blow up or that the solution
could become zero or negative, in terms of the limiting function f defined in (A5)
above. Thus, besides proving existence of solution, we find a “window” moving with
t where the solution is confined for any x . As we will see, in the CRRA case, the
window stretches as the final date T tends to infinity, so that the finite-horizon solution
converges to a solution of the infinite-horizon EL equation. To find the upper and lower
bounds, we use a maximum principle for nonlinear parabolic PDEs together with the
well-known envelope theorem due to Danskin (1966).
Recall the definitions made in the previous section of the constants α+, α− in (12),
as well as of M = supx∈(0,∞) ϕ(x)f (x) , m = infx∈(0,∞) ϕ(x)f (x) and β+, β− in (A5). We will
also use the following functions of t
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k−(t) = mβ
−eβ−(T−t)
α−m(sup(0,∞) f ′)(1 − eβ−(T−t)) + β−
,
k+(t) = Mβ
+eβ+(T−t)
α+M(inf(0,∞) f ′)(1 − eβ+(T−t)) + β+ .
(22)
Note that thanks to our assumptions, these functions are well defined and are obviously
smooth, with 0 < k−(t) < k+(t) < ∞ for all t ≤ T . In the following result,
uniqueness has to be understood in the class of functions considered in the theorem,
satisfying the given bounds.
Theorem 2 Let assumptions (A1–A5) hold, with limiting function f . Then there is a
unique non-negative solution φ of class C2,4 of the Cauchy problem (10) that satisfies
φ(t, 0) = 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ] and the estimates
0 < k−(t) f (x) ≤ φ(t, x) ≤ k+(t) f (x)
for all x > 0 and t ∈ [0, T ].
Proof See “Appendix.” unionsq
4.2 A nonexistence result
The lower estimate provided in Theorem 2 is useful to give a negative criterion for
the existence of an interior MPNE. To fix ideas, we consider a CRRA utility L(c) =
c1−δ/(1 − δ) with ρ(c) > N/(N − 1) (equivalently, α = (N − 1)/δ − N > 0).
The same analysis can be done for a general utility function, using the lower bound
α− defined in the previous section. As the following result shows, the (local) smooth
solution of the EL equation explodes in finite time, so no global smooth solution
exists. Since the EL equation is necessary for the optimality of a smooth MPNE, we
can conclude that no equilibrium exists in this case. The intuition for this behavior is
as follows: the willingness of the players to substitute consumption across time is too
high and this motivates a strong competition to obtain the resource. Eventually, the
consumption rate blows up in finite time. As in the discrete time model game studied
by Dutta and Sundaram (1993b), the Markovian first-best solution (N = 1) always
exist, but in the competition version, the existence is not guaranteed, unless an upper
bound is imposed in the intertemporal rate of substitution of the players, bound that
is related with the number of players.
Corollary 1 Suppose that in the conditions of Theorem 2, α > 0. Then, for T large
enough, there is no smooth solution of the EL equation.
Proof We reason by contradiction, assuming that a smooth solution exists. The bounds
we have found in the proof of Theorem 2 above are still valid. In particular, the lower
bound with α > 0 implies that the denominator of k−(t) in (22) vanishes at time
t̂ = T − 1
β
ln
(
1 + β
αm supx∈(0,∞) f ′(x)
)
,
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with 0 < t̂ < T , hence if a solution exists, it would satisfy
φ(t, x) ≥ k−(t) f (x) → ∞ as t → t̂+,
thus, the solution becomes infinite at a finite instant of time, reaching a contradiction.
unionsq
The corollary shows an extreme sensitivity of the MPNE with respect to variations in
the number of players that have free access to the asset, as explained in the corollary just
above. In fact, it implies the nonexistence of an interior MPNE, and thus, the imposition
of an upper bound in consumption is needed for the equilibrium to exist. In the CRRA
case, with δ denoting the elasticity of the marginal utility, there is a critical number,
Nˆ = integer part of (1 − δ)−1, such that if the number of players is Nˆ and a new
player enters the game, then the game changes drastically, since the MPNE blows up
in finite time. For instance, if δ < 1/2, then Nˆ = 1, so the solution in the single player
case is interior (as is always the case for the one-player model under our assumptions),
but when a new identical player enters the game, so that the game becomes a duopoly,
the competition is so intense that the players would like to consume all the resource
instantaneously, a characteristic already revealed by Reinganum and Stokey (1985) in
a related game. Dockner and Sorger (1996) and Sorger (1998) handle this case in the
deterministic game by imposing an upper bound in the maximal consumption rate,
proving the existence of a continuum of discontinuous MPNE.
4.3 Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium and value function
We next show that the solution of the EL equation is indeed an MPNE of the game.
Given φ(t, x) a solution of the EL Eq. (10) satisfying the boundary conditions (11),
let us define for x > 0
λ(t, x) = Λ(x, φ(t, x)) = L ′(φ(t, x))
and let H(x, c, p) = L(c) + p(F(x) − Nc). We will prove that λ is the costate
variable or asset shadow price, that is Vx = λ, where V denotes the value function of
the symmetric game. We will also show that φ is an MPNE and we will provide the
following expression for the value function in terms of φ(t, x): for x > 0
V (t, x)=
∫ x

λ(t, z) dz+
∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)
(
H(, φ(s, ), λ(s, ))+ 1
2
σ 2()λx (s, )
)
ds
+e−r(T −t)S(), (23)
where 0 <  < x is an arbitrary constant, and V (t, 0) = 0 for any t . The correspond-
ing expression for the value function in the infinite-horizon case is given below the
theorem.
In the proof of the following theorem, we will need to define constants k− and k+,
that satisfy the inequalities
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0 < k− ≡ min
{
m,− β
−
α− sup(0,∞) f ′
}
≤ k−(t) ≤ k+(t)
≤ max
{
M,− β
+
α+ inf(0,∞) f ′
}
≡ k+,
for any 0 ≤ t ≤ T , since α+ < 0.
Theorem 3 Assume that the conditions of Theorem 2 hold with a limiting function f .
Let 0 < γ < 1 be a constant such that for any k > 0, there is a polynomial q and a
constant D > 0 such that
∀x > 0, |L ′(k f (x))| ≤ q(x) + Dx−γ , (24)
lim
x→0+
x−γ F(x) = 0 (25)
and
lim
x→0+
σ(x)2 L ′′( f (x)) = 0. (26)
Then, the non-negative solution φ, whose existence is guaranteed by Theorem 2 , is
an MPNE of the differential game. Moreover, the value function of the players, given
by (23), is of class C2,5 in (0,∞), continuous in [0,∞) and V (t, 0) = 0 for all t ≥ 0.
Proof We first claim that for any T there exists a unique strong solution of
d X (s) = (F(X (s))− Nφ(s, X (s))) ds + σ(X (s)) dw(s), t < s ≤ T, X (t) = x,
(27)
which is positive almost surely. To show this, observe that both F and σ are locally
Lipschitz by assumption. On the other hand, the monotone condition
x F(x) − N xφ(t, x) + 1
2
σ 2(x) ≤ K x2
holds for some constant K , since φ(t, x) ≥ 0, x ≥ 0 and because by (A.1) F(x) ≤ Ax
and σ(x) ≤ σ x for some constants A and σ . Thus, according to Theorem 3.6 in Mao
(1997), there exists a unique strong solution of (27). Moreover, since F(0) = σ(0) =
φ(t, 0) = 0, Lemma 3.2 in Mao (1997) implies X ≥ 0 a.s.
To continue with the proof, let W (t, x) be the right-hand side of (23). From the regu-
larity ofφ, W is of class C2,5 in [0, T )×(0,∞). Let us show that limx→0+ W (t, x) = 0,
so that W (t, 0) can be defined as 0 = V (t, 0). Note that by (24) and since L ′ is decreas-
ing and k− f (x) ≤ φ(t, x) ≤ k+ f (x) for all x > 0
|λ(t, x)| = |L ′(φ(t, x))| ≤ max{|L ′(k− f (x))|, |L ′(k+ f (x))|} ≤ q(x) + Dx−γ ,
(28)
for a suitable polynomial q and constant D. Hence
∫ x
0
|λ(t, z)| dz ≤
∫ x
0
q(z)dz + D x
1−γ
1 − γ → 0, as x → 0
+,
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since the integral in the right-hand side is an homogeneous polynomial and γ < 1.
Since
∫ x
0 z
−γ dz is convergent, then
∫ x

λ(t, z) dz tends to zero as x → 0+ (and thus
 → 0+), which is the first integral in the definition of W . The second integral defining
W is with respect to time. Regarding the Hamiltonian H , note that L(0) = 0, so by
concavity of L , L ′(c)c ≤ L(c). Hence
L ′(φ(t, ))|F() − Nφ(t, )| ≤ L ′(φ(t, ))F() + N L ′(φ(t, ))φ(t, )
≤ (q() + D−γ )F() + N L(φ(t, ))
tends to 0 uniformly since  → 0+ by (25) and φ(t, ) → 0. The second summand
in the integral is 12σ
2()λx (s, ). Let us show that it tends to 0 as  → 0. Note that
φ(t, 0) = 0 and
k−
f (x)
x
≤ φ(t, x)
x
≤ k+ f (x)
x
imply k− f ′(0+) ≤ φx (t, 0+) ≤ k+ f ′(0+), thus φx (t, ·) is bounded around 0 and in
consequence
σ 2()L ′′(k+ f ())φx (s, ) ≥ σ 2()λx (s, ) ≥ σ 2()L ′′(k− f ())φx (s, )
where we have used that L ′′′ ≥ 0. Now, by (26), both sides tend to 0 as  → 0.
Now let us show that W satisfies the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation for any
x > 0 and t < T . Observe that, for x > 0, Wx = λ and Wxx = λx by the definition of
W . Let g(t) be the function of t given in the second summand of (23). The derivative
is
g′(t) = rg(t) + H(, φ(t, ), λ(t, )) + 1
2
σ 2()λx (t, ).
Also notice that
Wt (t, x) =
∫ x

λt (t, z) dz + g′(t).
Now, integrating with respect to x in (6), recalling the definition of W and rewriting
in terms of Wx , Wxx we have
0 = −r W (t, x) + rg(t) + Wt (t, x) − g′(t) + H(x, φ(t, x), λ(t, x))
− H(l, φ(t, l), λ(t, l)) + 1
2
σ 2(x)λx (t, x) − 12σ
2(l)λx (t, l)
= −r W (t, x) + Wt (t, x) + H(x, φ(t, x), λ(t, x)) + 12σ
2(x)λx (t, x)
= −r W (t, x) + Wt (t, x) + H(x, φ(t, x), Wx (t, x)) + 12σ
2(x)Wxx (t, x).
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Given Hypothesis (A2), the function ci −→ H(x, (ci |c−i ), λ) is concave and, by the
definition of λ,
Hci (t, x, (c
i |c−i ), λ) = Hci (t, x, (ci |c−i ), L ′(ci )) = L ′(ci ) − L ′(ci ) = 0.
Since critical points of concave functions are global maximum, we get that for arbitrary
admissible consumption strategies ci and for i = 1, . . . , N
0 = −r W (t, x) + Wt (t, x) + h(x, φ, Wx (t, x)) + 12σ
2(x)Wxx (t, x)
≥ −r W (t, x) + Wt (t, x) + H(t, x, (ci |φ−i ), Wx (t, x)) + 12σ
2(x)Wxx (t, x).
Hence, W is a solution of the HJB Eq. (4) given in Sect. 2. Moreover, W (T, x) = S(x).
This is easily seen as follows
W (T, x) =
∫ x

λ(T, z) dz + S() =
∫ x

L ′(φ(T, z)) dz + S()
=
∫ x

L ′(ϕ(z)) dz + S() = S(x),
since ϕ = (L ′)−1 ◦ S′. Now, condition (28), identity Vx = λ, together with the
continuity of W (t, x) at x = 0 proved above, imply that W is indeed the value function
of the problem and φi is the MPNE of player i, i = 1, . . . , N . This is because V is
polynomially bounded in x by (24), the definition of V given in (23) as a primitive
with respect to x of L ′(φ(t, x)), and the bounds found for φ, so we can apply the
verification theorems of Dockner et al. (2000) or Fleming and Soner (2006). unionsq
Remark 1 The result is extended to the infinite-horizon game with the help of the
usual transversality condition. We analyze only the stationary case. From (10), the
stationary MPNE φ is characterized by the EL equation
(
F(x) − Nφ(x) + (N − 1)R(φ(x)) + σ ′(x)σ (x))φ′(x) − 1
2
σ(x)2 P(φ(x))φ′(x)2
+1
2
σ(x)2φ′′(x) + R(φ(x))(r − F ′(x)) = 0. (29)
Now, no terminal condition is imposed, but we still have to consider the boundary
condition φ(0) = 0. The value function can be expressed in terms of the MPNE as
V (x) =
∫ x

L ′(φ(z)) dz + 1
r
(
L(φ()) + L ′(φ())(F() − Nφ())
+ 1
2
σ 2()L ′′(φ())φ′()
)
,
(30)
where 0 <  < x is a fixed, arbitrary constant.
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In the following result, Xc denotes the solution of (5) when the admissible profile of
strategies (c, . . . , c) is played.
Theorem 4 Assume that the conditions of Theorem 3 hold and that for all c ∈ U , the
transversality condition
lim sup
T→∞
Et x
{
e−r(T −t)V (Xc(T ))
}
= 0
holds. Then, a stationary and smooth solution φ of the Cauchy problem (29) is an
MPNE of the differential game. Moreover, the value function of the players is given
by (30).
Proof We can follow the same arguments as for the finite-horizon case shown in
Theorem 3 above, by selecting a bounded function S fulfilling the hypotheses required
by that theorem, so that limT→∞ e−rT S(x) = 0. For a Markov stationary strategy
φ(x), the costate variable λ is also independent of time. Taking the limit as T → ∞
in the function g obtained from (23) in the proof of Theorem 3, we have
g(t, ) = lim
T→∞
∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)
(
H(, φ(s, ), λ(s, )) + 1
2
σ()2λx (s, )
)
ds
=
(
H(, φ(), L ′(φ())) + 1
2
σ()2L ′′(φ())φ′()
)
lim
T→∞
∫ T
t
e−r(s−t) ds
= 1
r
(
H(, φ(), L ′(φ())) + 1
2
σ()2L ′′(φ())φ′()
)
.
We need the transversality condition of the theorem to apply a verification theorem of
Dockner et al. (2000) or Fleming and Soner (2006) for the infinite-horizon case. unionsq
5 The stochastic Keynes–Ramsey Rule
In this section, we describe how the EL Eq. (10) defines a stochastic KR rule for
the MPNE. This has the form of a forward–backward stochastic differential equation
(FBSDE).10 Note that the representation depends on the forward process chosen. In
this section we consider the stock process in equilibrium, X , but in further sections,
we will change to another processes which are more useful to our purposes.
10 FBSDEs were introduced by Bismut (1973) for stochastic control problems and studied with more gen-
erality in Pardoux and Peng (1990). FBSDEs play a central role in the statement of the stochastic maximum
principle, see Peng (1990), Yong and Zhou (1999), or Ma and Yong (1999). FBSDEs in optimization models
play the same role as the Hamiltonian system for the state-costate variable in deterministic dynamics, that is,
they constitute a part of the necessary conditions for optimality. In our game, the forward part corresponds
to the new state Y and the backward part to the optimal strategy C . The definition of a backward SDE is
not straightforward, as the filtration of the Brownian motion is an increasing family of σ -algebras, but the
stochastic process C evolves in the opposite direction of time. The measurability problems are overcome
by introducing the process Z , which is an integral part of the definition of the solution.
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Given a solution φ(t, x) of the PDE (10) satisfying φ(T, x) = ϕ(x), let C(s) =
φ(s, X (s)) for s ≥ t , where X satisfies the SDE of the stock variable in equilibrium
d X (s) = (F(X (s)) − NC(s)) ds + σ(X (s)) dw(s), X (t) = x > 0, (31)
A solution of the stochastic KR rule that we will show below is a triplet (Y, C, Z)
of {Fs}s≥t -adapted processes.
Theorem 5 Assume that the hypotheses of Theorem 3 hold and that σ ′′ is bounded.
Then, the symmetric MPNE is described by the stochastic KR rule given by the forward
SDE (31) and the backward SDE
dC(s)
C(s)
=
(
ρ(C(s))(F ′(X (s)) − r) + (1−N )ρ(C(s))C(s) Z(s)
σ (X (s))
− σ ′(X (s))Z(s)
+1
2
π(C(s))Z2(s)
)
ds + Z(s) dw(s), (32)
with final value
C(T ) = ϕ(X (T )),
where Z is a square-integrable {Fs}s≥t -adapted process. Moreover, Z is non-negative
a.s. in the case that both F and S are concave.
Proof Under the assumptions and by Theorem 2, there is a unique non-negative clas-
sical solution φ(t, x) of Eq. (10) satisfying φ(T, x) = ϕ(x) and φ(s, 0) = 0 for any
s ≥ t . Consider the forward SDE (31). Since φ, F and σ are uniformly Lipschitz, by
Lemma 3.2 in Mao (1997), the SDE admits a unique strong solution X (s), s ≥ t for
all t ≥ 0, which satisfies X (s) > 0 a.s.
By Itô’s formula applied to C(s) = φ(s, X (s)) and using the EL Eq. (10), we get
(we omit the argument (s, X (s)) on φ and its derivatives, to simplify notation)
dC(s) =
(
φt +
(
F(X (s)) − Nφ)φx + 12σ
2(X (s))φxx
)
ds + φxσ(X (s))dω(s)
=
(
R(φ)(F ′(X (s)) − r) + (1 − N )R(φ)φx − σ ′(X (s))σ (X (s))φx
+1
2
σ 2(X (s))P(φ)φ2x
)
ds + φxσ(X (s)) dω(s). (33)
Defining Z(s) = σ(X (s))φx (s, X (s))/φ(s, X (s)) for s ≥ t ≥ 0, and recalling that
R = cρ, P = π/c, the above equality reduces to (32). Note that Z is square-integrable
and {Fs}s≥t -adapted by the regularity of the functions involved. When T < ∞ the
terminal condition for C at T comes from (11). In the case of an infinite horizon,
we follow the definition given in Ma and Yong (1999), considering finite-horizon
approximations where the terminal condition for C is given by selecting previously
a suitable bequest function S, as explained in the sections above. Finally, since by
Theorem 8 (below) φx ≥ 0, we have Z(s) = σ(X (s))φx (s, X (s))/φ(s, X (s)) ≥ 0
a.s. unionsq
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Equality (32) shows how consumption of each player is distributed in equilibrium
across time. The expected rate of growth in future consumption with respect to current
consumption is, for s ≥ t, t ≥ 0
Es
(
dC
C
)
=
(
ρ(C)(F ′(X) − r) + (1 − N )ρ(C)C Z
σ(X) + 12π(C)Z2 − σ ′(X)Z
)
ds.
(34)
Due to the presence of uncertainty, the rule is much more complex than in the deter-
ministic case.11 Three additional summands appear, which depend on Z and collect
the uncertainty effects. The second term, (1 − N )ρ(C)C Z
σ
, shows how the number
of players and the uncertainty interact; this summand is negative when there are more
than one player, and is larger in absolute value as the number of players increases. The
third summand, 12π(C)Z
2
, contains the prudence attitude of the player. Since we are
supposing that π > 0, uncertainty speeds up mean consumption in comparison with
the deterministic case. More prudent agents prefer to plan higher mean increments in
consumption than less prudent ones. The fourth and last term, −σ ′(X)Z , is sensitive
to the variation of instantaneous variance, σ ′.
The backward–forward pair of Eqs. (31) and (32) is useful is exploring inverse
problems, as that studied in Chang (1988) for the stochastic optimal growth model.
That is, given a consumption function, the issue is to determine utility and recruit-
ment/production functions that rationalize the consumption function as optimal in the
control problem.
We address here a related question: to determine the set of admissible utilities for
which the MPNE is linear in the infinite horizon game with linear production and
variance functions. As it is well known, CRRA utilities are in this set. Are there any
more? It comes as a surprise that the answer is positive. To show this, let F(x) = Ax
and σ(x) = σ x , where the constants are positive. Suppose that the MPNE is φ(x) =
μx , with μ > 0. Note that C(s) = μX (s), thus dC = μd X = μ(AX − NC)ds +
μσ Xdw, or writing this equation in terms of C, dC = (A − μN )Cds + σCdw.
Thus, consumption is a geometric Brownian motion along the equilibrium trajectory.
In consequence, the expected mean increment of consumption, which is given in (34),
is constant, equal to  ≡ A−μN . Let us compute this term. In the proof of Theorem 5,
Z was defined as Z = σ(X)φ′(X)/φ(X). In this case, we have Z = σ , constant. Then,
from (34) and the fact that C is a geometric Brownian motion, we obtain the identity
(A − r)ρ(c) + (1 − N )μρ(c) + 1
2
σ 2π(c) − σ 2 = . (35)
11 The deterministic KR rule or “modified Ramsey rule” is obtained setting N = 1 and σ ≡ 0 in (33), to
get
C˙
C
= ρ(C)(F ′(X) − r),
where the (deterministic) process X satisfies
X˙ = F(X) − NC.
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This gives a relationship between ρ and π, π = b − aρ, where
a = 2
σ 2
(A − r + (1 − N )μ), b = 2 + σ
2
σ 2
.
Assume that a > 0, b > 1 and (b − 1)2 > 4a. The inequality a > 0 is true for the
one-player case when A > r , but it also holds for N > 1 if A is large enough. Hence
we can establish the following theorem.
Theorem 6 Consider the infinite-horizon game with linear recruitment and instan-
taneous variance and with a and b given in (35) that satisfy 0 < a < 1, b > 1
and (b − 1)2 > 4a. Then there exists utility functions with non-constant elasticity of
intertemporal substitution ρ and discount factors r > 0, such that the linear rule,
φ(x) = μx, is a MPNE of the game.
Proof To find L supporting the MPNE, we first use Lemma 2 that gives the solution of
the equation cρ′+ρ = −1+ρπ with π = b−aρ. The former equality is, as established
in Sect. 3.4, Footnote 9, the relationship between ρ and π associated with an utility
L . The latter equality comes from the optimality conditions. After substitution, the
ODE we get for ρ is the one studied in Lemma 2. Now, we resort to Proposition 2,
that asserts the existence of L if some assumptions hold. These assumptions are (16)–
(18), which are automatically fulfilled by ρ, as it was explained just after the proof
of Lemma 2. Other assumptions are θ > 0 and Δ > 0 that were also proved in
Sect. 3.4. It only remains to impose μ2 < μ1, that is, aη < 1. It is easy to see that
this is equivalent to b < 2 + a < 3. It is clear that φ satisfies the necessary optimality
conditions by construction. Let us check that it also satisfies the sufficient conditions of
Theorem 4. The equilibrium stock evolution is the geometric Brownian motion d X =
(A − Nμ)Xds + σ Xdω. Now, by Proposition 1 and 2, the utility function satisfies
L ′(c) = c−μ2/μ1(ψ1cθ + μ1), with μ2 < μ1 and θ > 0. Then, all the hypotheses of
Theorem 3 holds by taking a finite-horizon game with limiting function f (x) = x and
suitable S. It only remains to check the sufficient transversality condition. Computing
the conditional expectation of e−rT V (X (T )) is easy thanks to (30) and the fact that X
is a geometric Brownian motion. In summary, once we replace μ2/μ1 = aη we find
two conditions to be fulfilled for the conditional expectation to converge to 0
(θ + 1 − aη)
(
A − Nμ + σ
2
2
(θ − aη)
)
< r,
(1 − aη)
(
A − Nμ − σ
2
2
aη
)
< r.
The first inequality implies the second one as soon as aη < 1 and A > Nμ − σ 22 aη.
The definition of η was given above. unionsq
6 Comparative statics and further properties of the MPNE
The EL Equation, or some variations of it, is useful to reveal important properties of the
symmetric MPNE. In this section, we study the following: (i) the turnpike property of
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the MPNE; (ii) the monotonicity of the equilibrium consumption strategy with respect
to the resource stock; (iii) the curvature of the equilibrium consumption strategy; (iv)
the dependence with respect to the size of the uncertainty; (v) the dependence with
respect to variations in the number of players and with respect to the preference rate;
and finally, (vi) the issue of extinction.
6.1 Finite-horizon approximations of the stationary MPNE
Now we investigate the turnpike properties of the game in the case of CRRA prefer-
ences (but not necessarily the linear game, that is, F and σ do not need to be linear).
We prove next that for any smooth solution f (x) of the stationary EL equation, one
can find bequest functions S such that the associated finite-horizon MPNE converges
to f . This is useful in computing approximated solutions of the stationary EL equation
based on well-known methods for the Cauchy problem. In what follows, we study the
limit as T → ∞ of the solution of the EL equation for a finite-horizon T , although
we do not make the dependence of φ(t, x) on T explicit so as to shorten notation.
Theorem 7 Consider the game with CRRA instantaneous utility function L andα < 0.
Suppose that f is a solution of the stationary EL Eq. (29). Let S be any bequest function
of the finite-horizon game such that f serves as a limiting function. Then, the solution
of the finite-horizon EL equation, φ(t, x), converges to f (x) as T → ∞.
Proof See “Appendix.” unionsq
The reverse question, that is, whether the finite-horizon MPNE φ(t, x) converges
to a solution of the stationary EL equation is more difficult. A result in this direction
is obtained below for the linear game.
Corollary 2 If φ is an MPNE for the linear game, then
lim
T→∞ φ(t, x) = −
β + γ
α
x,
where β = A + σ 2(1 − δ)/2, γ = (r − A)/δ, α = −N + (N − 1)/δ, that is, it
converges to the stationary MPNE of the autonomous game.
Proof Notice that f (x) = −β + γ
α
x is a solution of the stationary EL Eq. (29), thus
the result is a consequence of Theorem 7, simply by taking this limiting function f . unionsq
6.2 Monotonicity
Under mild assumptions, the MPNE is monotonous non-decreasing in the asset stock:
the higher the stock of the stochastic productive asset, the higher the consumption is
in equilibrium. Once this is shown, we prove that the value function of the players
is concave. A direct proof of this fact in a differential game framework (even in the
symmetric case) does not seem to follow easily from standard arguments.
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Theorem 8 Assume that the assumptions of Theorem 2 hold and that both F and S
are concave. Then the MPNE is non-decreasing in x.
Proof See “Appendix.” unionsq
Corollary 3 Assume that the assumptions of Theorem 8 hold. Then the value function
is concave in x.
Proof This follows from the shadow price characterization given in the proof of Theo-
rem 3 and from Theorem 8 on the monotonicity of the optimal consumption program,
since
Vxx (t, x) = ∂
∂x
λ(t, x) = ∂
∂x
L ′(φ(t, x)) = L ′′(φ(t, x)) φx (t, x) ≤ 0.
unionsq
6.3 Concavity of the MPNE
In this section, we study whether the MPNE is concave with respect to the asset
level. Carroll and Kimball (1996) proved concavity of the consumption function in a
one-player game of finite horizon and discrete time, where uncertainty comes from
three sources: labor income, gross interest rate, and discount factor. The family of
utility functions considered by those authors were the CRRA class, strictly increasing,
concave, and satisfying L ′′′ ≥ 0. We limit ourselves to the linear game, but allowing
for general functions S. Note that Carroll and Kimball (1996) choose S = 0. Another
difference, of course, is that we work in the continuous-time case, with Brownian
uncertainty. To prove concavity of the equilibrium consumption function, we will
impose that ϕ is concave. This implies a condition both for the instantaneous utility
function and the bequest function that is provided in Lemma 3.
Theorem 9 Consider the linear game and suppose also that ϕ is concave. Then the
MPNE is concave with respect to x.
Proof See “Appendix.” unionsq
6.4 Dependence of the MPNE on the uncertainty
In this section, we study the way the symmetric MPNE depends on the size of uncer-
tainty. We will show that the MPNE is monotonous increasing in σ , more precisely,
we prove that under our assumptions plus a technical hypothesis to allow a change
of measure, σ1 ≤ σ2 implies φσ1 ≤ φσ2 , where we denote φσi the MPNE strat-
egy when the diffusion coefficient σ ∈ Σ , with Σ defined below. To obtain this
result is not straightforward, as the equilibrium is driven by a backward SDE, which
is coupled with a forward SDE. In our analysis, we will use a variation of the KR
rule found in Sect. 5 that represents the equilibrium. Let μ = F
σ
+ σ ′2 and let
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Σ = {σ : R+ −→ R+ : μ bounded}. For σ ∈ Σ , let Y σ be the process that
satisfies (we omit the time argument to simplify notation)
dY (s) = (F(Y ) + (σσ ′)(Y )) ds + σ(Y ) dw(s), Y (t) = x .
Let us define gN (c) = −Nc + (N − 1)R(c). Since we are supposing in (A3) (a)
[see also (12)] that α+ = ρ+(N − 1) − N < 0 and R(c) ≤ ρ+c, then gN (c) ≤ 0 for
all N ≥ 1 and all c ≥ 0.
Along Y σ , the equilibrium satisfies the BSDE
dC(s) =
(
R(C)(F ′(Y ) − r) + 1
2
P(C)C2 Z2 − gN (C)Z
σ(Y )
)
ds + Zdw(s),
C(T ) = ϕ(Y (T )),
(36)
where Z is given by Z = σ(Y σ (s))φx (s, Y σ (s)) and φ is the solution of the EL
equation. The proof follows the same lines as the proof of the KR rule in Theorem 5.
Theorem 10 If both F and S are concave, and ϕ is monotonous non-decreasing, then
the MPNE is monotonous non-decreasing with respect to σ ∈ Σ .
Proof See “Appendix.” unionsq
In the limit, as the diffusion coefficient tends to zero, and assuming that an MPNE
exists of the deterministic game and that convergence holds, we get that the players
are more conservative in the deterministic case than when some noise is present. This
conclusion holds at every pair of date and stock of the resource, and not only in terms
of expected mean growth. Thus, in this model, independently of the sign of the relative
prudence index, the players consume at a higher rate as the uncertainty is larger (as
measured by the function σ ). This result also holds for the one-player case.
6.5 Variation in the number of players and on the time preference
Now we will study the dependence of the MPNE with respect to variations in the
number of players. The effect of the number of players on the consumption effort
depends on the marginal substitution rateρ(c). Whenρ(c) > 1, consumption increases
with N , when ρ(c) < 1 it decreases, and when ρ(c) = 1 (the logarithm case), it is
independent of the number of players. We will use the KR rule to show these facts.
Theorem 11 Suppose that the hypotheses of Theorem 5 hold and let N1 ≤ N2. Then
φN1 ≤ φN2 if ρ(c) ≥ 1 for any c ≥ 0, and φN1 ≥ φN2 if ρ(c) ≤ 1 for any c ≥ 0.
Proof See “Appendix.” unionsq
In the linear game above, the MPNE is non-decreasing with the number of agents
if and only if δ ≤ 1.
Theorem 12 Suppose that the hypotheses of Theorem 5 hold. If r1 ≤ r2, then φr1 ≤
φr2 .
Proof See “Appendix.” unionsq
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6.6 Extinction
We explore here the question of extinction of the asset in the long run. This has already
been investigated in Clemhout and Wan (1985) in the model without uncertainty. These
authors proved that with the assumptions L(0) = 0, L ′(0) ∈ (0,∞), L ′′ < 0, Nr <
F ′(0) < ∞, there exists an x˜ > 0 such that in equilibrium, any initial stock level
x ∈ (0, x˜) declines to extinction in finite time. This is not true under cartelization. Our
main finding is that uncertainty strengthens the competition of the players compared
to the deterministic case, and the resource declines to extinction with probability 1
from any initial level of the resource as the time horizon tends to infinity if the number
of players is large enough. Mitra and Sorger (2014) study a discrete version of the
deterministic model with specific functional forms, and find a necessary and sufficient
condition for the resource to not become extinct in equilibrium.
For our purposes, we consider linear F(x) = Ax and σ(x) = σ x , but an arbitrary
utility function L satisfying our standing assumptions. For a solution φ(t, x) of the
EL Eq. (10) we know from Theorem 2 that
k− f (x) ≤ φ(t, x) ≤ k+ f (x),
whenever f is a suitable limiting function. Recall the definition of the constants k−
and k+ just above Theorem 3.
k− = min
{
m,− β
−
α− sup(0,∞) f ′
}
, k+ = max
{
M,− β
+
α+ inf(0,∞) f ′
}
,
where α−, α+ are defined in (12) and β− and β+ in Assumption (A5) (c). Notice that,
given that both F and σ are linear, we can also take f (x) = x . Hence the MPNE
satisfies
k−x ≤ φ(t, x) ≤ k+x (37)
for any t ≤ T , for any T and for any x ≥ 0. We are free to select a bequest function
S such that the associated ϕ satisfies the standing assumption, since we are only
interested in the limiting behavior of the solution. The asset follows the SDE
d X (s) = (AX (s) − Nφ(s, X (s))) ds + σ X (s) dw(s), X (t) = x .
Let us denote by Xφ(s; t, x) the unique strong solution. By (37), the drift is bounded
by
AX − Nc ≤ (A − Nk−)X.
Consider the SDE
d X(s) = (A − Nk−)X ds + σ X dw(s).
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By the classical comparison theorem for SDEs, Ikeda and Watanabe (1977), we have
0 ≤ Xφ ≤ X a.s. Hence, if the SDE for X is asymptotically stable, the same happens
for the SDE for X .
Proposition 4 Suppose that
A − Nk− < σ
2
2
. (38)
Then the equilibrium X ≡ 0 is asymptotically stable in the large, i.e., it is stochastically
stable
lim
x→0 P{sups≥t |X (s; t, x) ≥ 0|} = 0
and for any initial level of stock x > 0
P
{
lim
T→∞ X (T ; t, x) = 0
}
= 1.
Proof The proof is a direct application of Example 2.7 in Mao (1997). For X = 0 to
be asymptotically stable, it suffices that the drift term should be smaller than σ 2/2. unionsq
Inequality (38) depends on several parameters of the game and on the number of
players. Since −β−/α− tends to 0 as N → ∞ because α− → 0, we have k− =
−β−/α− for a big enough N . Then, for a large number of players N
A − Nk− = A + β
−N
(a− − 1)N − a− .
This expression is decreasing with N and in the limit as N → ∞ inequality (38) is
A + β
−
a− − 1 <
σ 2
2
.
7 Conclusions
The purpose of this paper has been twofold. On the one hand, to provide an easy
method to obtain the EL equations of a stochastic differential game where the uncer-
tainty is modeled as a diffusion process and players’ decisions cannot influence the
size of the uncertainty. On the other hand, to carry out a rigorous study of a sym-
metric stochastic dynamic game in continuous time where players consume from a
productive asset in a noncooperative way. The results obtained prove the usefulness
of the EL equations in proving the existence and uniqueness of the MPNE in the game
mentioned above, under quite general assumptions. Moreover, it has also been shown
how the EL equations are specially suitable to make comparative statics exercises of
the equilibrium and to answer important questions of the nature of the dependence
of the equilibrium on uncertainty, its curvature, and the issue of extinction. As we
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show, EL equations are equivalent to a stochastic KR rule that is a natural extension
of the deterministic one and that shows in a neat way how the uncertainty changes the
consumption-saving decisions of the players with respect to the deterministic case. To
our knowledge, most of these questions are completely answered for the first time in
this paper, thanks to the approach based on the EL equations. Our methods of proof
combine methods of partial differential equations to show properties that concern first-
or second-order derivatives of the consumption function, as well as the convergence
of finite-horizon approximations, together with comparison theorems of FBSDEs for
making comparative statics.
With the exception of Sorger (1998), which proves the existence of MPNE in
the deterministic infinite-horizon game (but, as explained in the paper, with just the
opposite hypothesis that we impose about the elasticity of the marginal utility, and
assuming a specific recruitment function), other investigations focus on a particular
form of the utility function, the recruitment function, or the diffusion coefficient.
It is by no means trivial to prove the existence of the Nash equilibrium with the
property of subgame perfection, even for what we can consider by now is a classical
game that has received a lot of attention over the last few decades. As shown in the
paper, in our nonexistence result of the MPNE, one cannot freely work with any number
of players and any strictly concave and smooth utility function, as it could be that no
MPNE exists unless one sets an upper bound in the maximal consumption rate of the
players. To address these questions seriously, avoiding heuristic claims that could not
be supported on the existence of the object that is analyzed, it seems unavoidable to
impose the correct amount of smoothness in the functions defining the game. The
following table clarifies the generality with which we attain our results (Table 1). For
instance, existence and uniqueness of the MPNE is obtained under our the general
hypotheses imposed in the paper (A1–A5), but our conclusions about the dependence
on uncertainty require the additional assumption of both the recruitment function and
bequest function to be concave. The rest of the table has a similar interpretation.
It is our hope to have had success conveying other researches about the usefulness
of the EL equations approach to analyze models from economics, and that they include
it as an additional tool for economic analysis. Our aim for the future is to study other
Table 1 List of results obtained
and assumptions employed Result Assumptions on functionsL , S, F, σ, ϕ
Existence, uniqueness General
Turnpike L CRRA
Monotonicity S and F concave
Concavity of MPNE Linear game, ϕ concave and
non-decreasing
Dependence on uncertainty S and F concave
Dependence on N and r General
Extinction F and σ linear
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relevant models with this technique, as well as to extend the method to problems where
the players influence the size of the uncertainty through their decisions.
Appendix: Proofs
In this appendix, we collect the proofs of the results that are not shown in the body
text. It also include some auxiliary results that are used in the proofs.
Proof of Theorem 2
Let RT = [0, T ] × (0,∞). We first state an auxiliary result.
Existence of solutions to quasilinear parabolic PDEs.
Theorem 13 There exists at least one bounded solution in RT of the Cauchy problem
uτ − ∂
∂x
a(τ, x, u, ux ) = b(τ, x, u, ux ),
with initial condition
u(0, x) = u0(x), x > 0.
if all of the following conditions are satisfied.
C1. u0 is of class C4 and bounded.
C2. Functions a and b are of class C3 and C2, respectively.
C3. There are non-negative constants b1 and b2 such that for all x and u
(
b(τ, x, u, 0) + ∂
∂x
a(τ, x, u, 0)
)
u ≤ b1u2 + b2.
C4. For all M > 0, there are constants μ2(M) ≥ μ1(M) > 0 such that, if τ, x and
u are bounded in modulus by M, then for arbitrary p
μ1(M) ≤ ∂
∂p
a(τ, x, u, p) ≤ μ2(M)
and
(
|a| +
∣
∣
∣
∣
∂a
∂u
∣
∣
∣
∣
)
(1 + |p|) +
∣
∣
∣
∣
∂a
∂x
∣
∣
∣
∣ + |b| ≤ μ2(M)(1 + |p|)2.
The problem admits no more than a classical solution in RT that is bounded together
with its derivatives of first and second orders if the following additional conditions
hold.
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C5. For all M > 0 there are non-negative constants ν1(M) and ν2(M) such that
max
(t,x)∈RT|u|,|p|≤M
∣
∣
∣
∣
∂2a
∂p∂u
,
∂2a
∂p2
,
∂ A
∂p
∣
∣
∣
∣ ≤ ν1(M),
min
(t,x)∈RT|u|,|p|≤M
∂ A
∂u
≥ −ν2(M),
where
A = a − ∂a
∂u
p − ∂a
∂x
.
Proof The result is a consequence of Theorem 8.1 of Ladyzhenskaya et al (1969),
the only difference being that we have set the problem in [0, T ] × (0,∞) instead of
[0, T ] × R and that we require more smoothness. The method of proof of Theorem
8.1 in Ladyzhenskaya et al consists in considering truncated problems on the strip
[0, T ] × [1/n, n] with boundary conditions un(0, x) = u0(x) for all x ∈ [1/n, n]
and12 un(t, 1/n) = u0(1/n), un(t, n) = u0(n) for all t ≥ 0. These solutions converge
smoothly to a solution u of the original equation as n → ∞. unionsq
Motivated by the necessity to drop the boundedness of the data defining the game,
we will consider the EL Eq. (10) for the function u = φ/ f written in the divergence
form
uτ − ∂
∂x
a(x, ux ) = b(x, u, ux ), (39)
where τ = T − t and
a(x, p) = σ(x)
2
2
p,
b(x, u, p) =
(
F − Nu f + (N − 1)R(u f ) + f
′
f σ
2
)
p
+
(
F − Nu f + (N − 1)R(u f ) + σ ′σ
)
u
f ′
f
+ 1
2
σ 2u
f ′′
f −
σ 2
2
P(u f )
f (p f + u f
′)2 + r − F
′
f R(u f ).
The initial condition is
u(0, x) = ϕ0(x) = ϕ(x)f (x) . (40)
Note that even if the initial condition ϕ0 is now bounded by assumption, still we cannot
apply the above theorem directly. The difficulties are two: (i) the function σ vanishes
12 The selection of the boundary conditions at 1/n and n can be done differently, with the only requisite
of being compatible with u0(x), that is, conserving continuity and smoothness; in the proof below, we will
use a different set of boundary conditions still compatible.
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at x = 0, thus it is not uniformly bounded away from zero; and (ii) the function P is
in general not defined at 0 and in fact limc→0+ P(c) = ∞ for problems with CRRA
utility, where P(c) = (1+δ)/c. To deal with (i) we consider the PDE (39) on bounded
subintervals In = [1/n, n], n = 1, 2, . . ., and then we take a limit as n → ∞, while
for (ii) we will prove that the solutions un found in the subintervals above remain
uniformly bounded away from 0, in the sense that there exists a lower bound lm > 0
such that un ≥ lm for all n ≥ m for all x ∈ Im . As a byproduct of the proof, we obtain
the estimates claimed in the theorem.
– C.1. is fulfilled, since ϕ0(x) = ϕ(x)/ f (x) is bounded and smooth on (0,∞), by
assumption.
– C.2. holds, as the function a has the required smoothness. As explained above, we
will prove below that u never vanishes on (0,∞), thus the term P(u f ) does not
pose any problem at all for the smoothness of function b.
– C.3. There are constants b1 and b2 such that
b(x, u, 0)u =
(
F − Nu f + (N − 1)R(u f ) + σ ′σ
)
u2
f ′
f
+ 1
2
σ 2u2
f ′′
f −
σ 2
2
P(u f )
f (u f
′)2u + r − F
′
f R(u f )u ≤ b1u
2 + b2
(since a(x, 0) = 0). To see this, note that, thanks to our assumptions,
b(x, u, 0)u ≤ α+u3 f ′ +
(
(F + σ ′σ) f
′
f +
1
2
σ 2
f ′′
f −
π−
2
σ 2
( f ′
f
)2
+ γ +
)
u2
< α+( min
x∈(0,∞) f
′)u3 + β+u2 ≤ β+u2,
since α+ < 0 and the solution u > 0 (this will be proved below).
– C.4. first part, is also fulfilled, as
∂a(x, p)
∂p
= σ
2(x)
2
is positive for x > 0 and continuous, thus it is bounded away from 0, as well as
bounded above in any compact subset [1/M, M] of (0,∞).13 The second part of
C.4 is a local assumption, that also holds because function |b| is quadratic in p,
with continuous coefficients, and thus bounded on compact subsets of (0,∞); the
same is true for
(
|a| +
∣
∣
∣
∣
∂a
∂u
∣
∣
∣
∣
)
(1 + |p|) +
∣
∣
∣
∣
∂a
∂x
∣
∣
∣
∣ =
σ 2(x)
2
|p|(1 + |p|) + |σ(x)σ ′(x)||p|,
13 Note that what we require here is μ1(M) ≤ ∂a(x,p)∂p ≤ μ2(M) for x belonging to a compact set of the
kind [1/M, M] and not simply to x ≤ M . This is a slight variation that is not problematic in this framework.
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which is also quadratic in p, and since both σ and σ ′ are continuous and thus they
are bounded in compact subsets of [0,∞).
– C.5. Both σ and σ ′ are continuous, and therefore bounded over any compact
interval of the state space, achieving uniqueness of the bounded solution
We now show that we can construct a solution u > 0 of the PDE (39) as limit
of positive truncated solutions un in [0, T ] × [1/n, n] as n → ∞. Then, C.2 holds,
as P is smooth in (0,∞). In fact we prove more than that, as we obtain upper and
lower estimates for the solution. The latter will imply in particular that the solution is
positive for x > 0.
Let the PDE (39) with initial condition (40) and boundary conditions at the extreme
points of the interval In given by
un(τ, 1/n) = β
+eτβ+ϕ0(1/n)
α+ϕ0(1/n) f ′(1/n)(1 − eτβ+) + β+ ,
un(τ, n) = β
+eτβ+ϕ0(n)
α+ϕ0(n) f ′(n)(1 − eτβ+) + β+ .
(41)
The reason for this particular selection of the boundary conditions is shown next. For-
mulating these approximating problems, we have eliminated the degeneration in the
truncated equation. It is easy to check that all conditions in Theorem 8.1 of Ladyzhen-
skaya et al. (1968) are fulfilled in a small neighborhood of τ = 0, since ϕ0(x) is
bounded away from zero in In and hence a solution un of the truncated problem exists
which does not vanish. From this, our aim is to extend this truncated solution to all
[0, T ] and after this, to get the solution φ(t, x) with initial condition φ(0, x) = ϕ(x)
as the smooth limit of un(τ, x) f (x) as n → ∞. As explained above, this is the pro-
cedure used in Ladyzhenskaya et al. (1968). We show next that the local solution can
be extended in time and space. To this end, we define
Mn(τ ) = max
y∈[1/n,n] un(τ, y).
By Danskin’s Theorem, function Mn is almost everywhere differentiable, and at points
of differentiability, the derivative M˙n(τ ) = un,τ (τ, xn(τ )), where un(τ, xn(τ )) =
Mn(τ ).
We prove that for any τ
Mn(τ ) ≤ β
+eτβ+ Mn(0)
α+(minIn f ′)Mn(0)(1 − eτβ+) + β+
. (42)
where Mn(0) = supx∈In ϕ0(x). Suppose, by way of contradiction, that Mn(τ0) is
greater that the right-hand side of (42) for some τ0 > 0. Let τ 0 be the inferior of all the
τ0s satisfying this property, and hence, by continuity of Mn, Mn(τ 0) equals the right-
hand side of (42). Then xn(τ ) is interior to In for every τ ∈ [τ 0, τ0], due to the boundary
conditions (41). In consequence, un,x (τ, xn(τ )) = 0 and un,xx (τ, xn(τ )) ≤ 0 for any
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τ ∈ [τ 0, τ0]. Hence, (∂/∂x)(σ 2un,x )|(τ,xn(τ )) ≤ 0. This information, used in the Eq.
(39) for νn , provides the following chain of inequalities
M˙n(τ ) ≤ b(xn(τ ), Mn(τ ), 0)
=
(
F − N f Mn(τ ) + (N − 1)R( f Mn(τ )) + σ ′σ
)
Mn(τ )
f ′
f
+ 1
2
σ 2 Mn(τ )
f ′′
f −
1
2
σ 2
P( f Mn(τ ))
f (Mn(τ ) f
′)2 + r − F
′
f R( f Mn(τ ))
≤ α+M2n (τ ) f ′ +
(
(F + σ ′σ) f
′
f +
1
2
σ 2
f ′′
f −
π−
2
σ 2
( f ′
f
)2
+γ +
)
Mn(τ )
< α+(min
In
f ′)M2n (τ ) + β+Mn(τ ), a.e. τ.
(43)
We have used the definitions of α+ and β+ done in Assumption (A3) and (A5),
respectively, and the fact that α+ < 0. From this differential inequality of Ricatti we
get the estimate
Mn(τ ) ≤ β
+e(τ−τ 0)β+ Mn(τ 0)
α+(minIn f ′)Mn(τ 0)(1 − e(τ−τ 0)β+) + β+
.
Once the expression for Mn(τ 0) = β+eτ0β
+ Mn(0)
α+(minIn f ′)Mn(0)(1−eτ0β+ )+β+
, which holds by our
contradiction argument is substituted into (A.1) inequality (42) easily follows.
Following the same technique, we get the lower estimate. Consider the solution vn
of the PDE with the boundary conditions
vn(τ, 1/n) = β
−eτβ−ϕ0(1/n)
α−ϕ0(1/n) f ′(1/n)(1 − eτβ−) + β− ,
vn(τ, n) = β
−eτβ−ϕ0(n)
α−ϕ0(n) f ′(n)(1 − eτβ−) + β− .
and
mn(τ ) = min
y∈[1/n,n] vn(τ, y),
with the minimum attained at some yn(τ ). Similar arguments as done above for the
maximum lead to the estimate
mn(τ ) ≥ β
−eτβ−mn(0)
α−mn(0)(maxIn f ′)(1 − eτβ−) + β−
. (44)
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as follows. By way of contradiction one finds
m˙n(τ ) ≥ g(yn(τ ), mn(τ ), 0) ≥ α−(max
In
f ′)m2n(τ ) + β−mn(τ ), a.e. τ.
Reasoning much as for the case of Mn , one gets the estimate (44) easily. Thus, we
have shown that the local solution is strictly uniformly bounded away from zero in the
intervals In and that it is also bounded above. Since this fact is independent of τ , as
well as the upper bound obtained above, the solution can be extended up to the whole
[0, T ], for any T .
Hence, since vn → v, we have that v is bounded away from zero, and hence
v is a solution of the Cauchy problem, since all the conditions of the Theorem of
Ladyzhenskaya et al. (1968) are fulfilled. Taking limits as n → ∞ one has
φ(t, x)
f (x) = u(T − t, x) ≥ m(T − t) ≥
β−e(T−t)β−m(0)
α−m(0)(sup(0,∞) f ′)(1 − e(T−t)β−) + β−
.
By the above estimates the limit φ(t, x) = u(T − t, x) f (x) is a solution of the Cauchy
problem (10) satisfying
φ(t, x)
f (x) = v(T − t, x) ≤ M(T − t) ≤
β+e(T−t)β+ M
α+(inf(0,∞) f ′)M(1 − e(T−t)β+) + β+ ,
since Mn(0) → M as n → ∞, and inf(0,∞) f ′ ≤ minIn f ′.
Proof of Theorem 7
With CRRA preferences, ρ+ = ρ− = ρ = 1/δ, α+ = α− = α and π+ = π− =
b = 1 + δ. See the definition of these constants in Sect. 3, Assumption (A3) and in
(12). See also the computations done after Definition 4. We will follow the proof of
Theorem 2, using the same notation. Retaking inequality (43) in the aforementioned
proof, in the case of CRRA preferences we have
M˙n(τ ) ≤ b(xn(τ ), Mn(τ ), 0)
=
(
F − N f Mn(τ ) + (N − 1)a f Mn(τ ) + σ ′σ
)
Mn(τ )
f ′
f
+ 1
2
σ 2 Mn(τ )
f ′′
f −
1
2
σ 2
b
f 2 Mn(τ ) (Mn(τ ) f
′)2 + r − F
′
f Mn(τ )a
≤ α f ′M2n (τ )+
(
(F + σ ′σ) f ′+ 1
2
σ 2 f ′′− 1
2
σ 2
b
f f
′2+a(r −F ′) f
) Mn(τ )
f
Since f is solution of the stationary EL Eq. (10) with CRRA preferences, then
(F + σ ′σ) f ′ + 1
2
σ 2 f ′′ − 1
2
σ 2
b
f f
′2 + (r − F ′)a f = −α f f ′.
40
Plugging this into the inequality above it simplifies to
M˙n(τ ) ≤ α f ′M2n (τ ) − α f ′Mn(τ ) ≤ α(infIn f
′)M2n (τ ) − α(sup
In
f ′)Mn(τ ).
Hence
Mn(τ ) ≤ Mn(0)e
−τα(supIn f ′)
−Mn(0)(1 − e−τα(supIn f ′)) + 1
.
A similar computation for the minimum shows
mn(τ ) ≥ mn(0)e
−τα(inf In f ′)
−mn(0)(1 − e−τα(inf In f ′)) + 1
.
Notice that in the former case f ′ is evaluated at the point where un attains a maximum
in In = [1/n, n], say xn , whereas in the latter case it is at the point where un attains a
minimum, say yn . Thus,
mn(0)e−τα(inf In f
′)
−mn(0)(1 − e−τα(inf In f ′)) + 1
≤ un(t, x) ≤ Mn(0)e
−τα(supIn f ′)
−Mn(0)(1 − e−τα(supIn f ′)) + 1
.
Taking the limit as n tends to ∞ and since un(t, x) → φ(t, x)/ f (x) as n → ∞, we
find
me−τα(inf In f ′)
−m(1 − e−τα(inf In f ′)) + 1 ≤
φ(τ, x)
f (x) ≤
Me−τα(supIn f ′)
−M(1 − e−τα(supIn f ′)) + 1 .
As T → ∞, τ → ∞ and one finally find that φ(t, x) converges to f (x).
Proof of Theorem 8
We follow the same scheme of proof as in Theorems 2 and 7. Notice that the hypotheses
of the theorem imply ϕ′(x) = S′′(x)/L ′′(S′(x)) ≥ 0. Now, derive the EL Eq. (10)
with respect to x and let v = φx . Then w solves the Cauchy problem
vτ − 12
∂
∂x
(σ (x)2vx ) = gx (x, φ, v) + vgc(x, φ, v) + vx gv(x, φ, v)
+vσ ′(x)2 + vσ(x)σ ′′(x) + vxσ(x)σ ′(x).
v(0, x) = ϕ′(x) ≥ 0.
Function g is
g(x, c, v) = (F(x) − Nc + (N − 1)R(c))v − 1
2
σ(x)2 P(c)v2 + (r − F ′(x))R(c).
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We will follow a similar strategy of proof as in Theorem 2, considering truncated
intervals for the variable x, In = [1/n, n] and the solution vn(τ, x) in [0, T ] × In
satisfying the boundary conditions
vn(τ, 1/n) = ϕ′(1/n) > 0, vn(τ, n) = ϕ′(n) > 0.
Let νn(τ ) = minx∈In vn(τ, x). A reasoning by contradiction, assuming the existence
of τ0 satisfying νn(τ0) < νn(0), will lead to a contradiction as follows. Let τ 0 be the
inferior of all the τ s satisfying this property; by continuity of νn, νn(τ 0) = νn(0).
Then, we obtain the inequality
ν˙n ≥ gx (x, φ, νn) + νn
(
gc(x, φn, νn) + σ ′(x)2 + σ(x)σ ′′(x)
)
.
We have used the same arguments as those used in the proof of Theorem 2, hence we
do not repeat it here. The notation φn is used for the solution of the EL Eq. (10) in
[0, T ]× In . The term φn(τ, ζ(τ )), where ζ(τ ) minimizes vn over In , does not pose any
problem at all. Given that gx (x, c, v) = v
(
F ′(x) − vσ(x)σ ′(x)P(c)) − F ′′(x)R(c),
we have
ν˙n ≥ −F ′′(x)R(φn)
+ νn
(
F ′(x) − νnσ(x)σ ′(x)P(φn) + gc(x, φn, νn) + σ ′(x)2 + σ(x)σ ′′(x)
)
,
with νn(τ ) = 0. Since F ′′ is concave and R is non-negative, −F ′′(x)R(c) ≥ 0, thus
νn(τ ) ≥ νn(τ 0)e
∫ τ
τ0
{··· } dτ = 0 ∀τ ∈ [τ 0, τ0],
in contradiction with νn(τ0) < 0. Hence 0 ≤ νn(τ ) ≤ vn(τ, x) for all τ, x ∈ In , and
then the limit function φx (τ, x) ≥ 0.
Proof of Theorem 9
We first establish a lemma about the concavity of the consumption rate at the final
time T . It is established for general L , not only in the class CRRA. In the lemma, ρ{}
stands for the elasticity of the marginal utility and π{} for the relative prudence index
of a given utility function. For the linear game, the lemma implies that ϕ is concave if
and only if the bequest function S satisfies
S′(x)S′′′(x)
S′′2(x)
≥ 1 + 1
δ
.
Lemma 3 ϕ′′ ≤ 0 if and only if for all x > 0
ρS(x)πS(x) ≥ ρL(ϕ(x))πL(ϕ(x)).
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Proof Deriving twice in L ′(ϕ(x)) = S′(x) we get
L ′′(ϕ(x))ϕ′(x) = S′′(x),
L ′′′(ϕ(x))ϕ′(x)2 + L ′′(ϕ(x))ϕ′′(x) = S′′′(x).
Solving for ϕ′′(x) and imposing ϕ′′(x) ≤ 0 we obtain the inequality (we eliminate
arguments)
S′′′
S′′2
≥ L
′′′
L ′′2
or equivalently, multiplying both sides of the inequality by S′ > 0
(−x S′′′
S′′
)(−S′
x S′′
)
≥
(−ϕL ′′′
L ′′
)( −S′
ϕL ′′
)
.
Noting that S′ = L ′(ϕ), and plugging this equality into the right-hand side of the
inequality above, we obtain the claim of the lemma. unionsq
We now proceed with the proof of Theorem 9 with the same techniques as those
used in the proofs of Theorems 2 and 8, deriving twice in the EL Eq. (10) to find a PDE
for φxx . We refer the reader to the proofs of those theorems for filling in the missing
details. Deriving twice in (10) we get
(φxx )τ − ∂
∂x
(
σ 2x2
2
φxxx
)
= j (x, φ, φx , φxx , φxxx )
where the function j is defined as
j (x, c, v, w, z) = w
(
3σ 2 + 2F ′(x) + 3αv + r − F
′(x)
δ
− 4σ 2x 1 + δ
c
v
+5
2
σ 2x2
1 + δ
c2
v2 − σ 2x2 1 + δ
c
w
)
− σ 2v2 1 + δ
c
(
1 − xv
c
)2
− F ′′′(x)c
δ
+ F ′′(x)
(
1 − 2
δ
)
v
+
(
2σ 2x + F(x) + gN (c) − σ 2x2 1 + δ
c
v
)
z.
Recall that in the CRRA case, α = −N + (N − 1)/δ. Following the same method of
proof as in the above referenced theorems, and defining wn as the solution of the PDE
above in the interval In , we get
wn,τ − ∂
∂x
(
σ 2x2
2
wn,x
)
= j (x, φn, φn,x , wn, wn,x ). (45)
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Here, φn denotes the restriction of φ to [0, T ] × In . Let ωn(τ ) = maxIn wn(τ, x).
Reasoning by contradiction supposing that ωn(τ ) > 0 at some τ > 0, one has that
wn,x (τ ) = 0 and ∂∂x
(
σ 2x2
2 wn,x
)
≤ 0, thus plugging this into Eq. (45) we get
ω˙n ≤ ωn {· · · } − σ 2φ2n,x
1 + δ
φn
(
1 − xφn,x
φn
)2
− F ′′′(x)φn
δ
+ F ′′(x)
(
1 − 2
δ
)
φn,x .
In the linear game F ′′ = F ′′′ = 0, hence the second summand in the above expression
is non-positive. Given that ωn(0) = sup[0,∞) ϕ′′(x) ≤ 0 is also non-positive, we
arrive to a contradiction, because it is never possible to have ωn(τ ) > 0 from the
above estimate for ω˙n .
In the following proofs, recall that gN (c) = −Nc + (N − 1)R(c).
Proof of Theorem 10
Let us show that if σi ∈ Σ, i = 1, 2 and σ1 ≤ σ2, then Y σ1 ≤ Y σ2 a.s. Clearly, for
σ ∈ Σ,μ(Y (s)) satisfies the Novikov condition and then
M(s) = exp
{∫ s
t
μ(Y (a))d(a) − 1
2
∫ s
t
μ2(Y (a))da
}
, s ∈ [t, T ]
is a P-martingale, where P is the objective probability measure. Define now the prob-
ability measure P˜ by
dP˜
dP
= M(T ).
It is known that P˜ is absolutely continuous with respect to P. By Girsanov’s Theorem,
ω˜(s) = ω(s) − ∫ st μ(Y (a))d(a) is a P˜-Brownian motion and, in the new measure, Y
satisfies
dY (s) = 1
2
σ(Y (s))σ ′(Y (s))ds + σ(Y (s))dw(s).
Now, given that 0 < σ1 ≤ σ2, it holds that
∫ y
x
dz
σ1(z)
≥ ∫ y
x
dz
σ2(z)
for all y ≥ x , which
is the sufficient condition of Example 2 of Zhiyuan (1984) assuring Y σ1 ≤ Y σ2 for
every s ∈ [t, T ], P˜-a.s., whence P-a.s. Then ϕ(Y σ1(T )) ≤ ϕ(Y σ2(T )) P-a.s., since ϕ
is non-decreasing by hypothesis.
Now, let us define f i (ω, s, C, Z) as the drift term in the backward SDE for C in
(36) when the forward process is Y σi (s), i = 1, 2, that is
f i (ω, s, C, Z) = C
(
ρ(C)(F ′(Y σi ) − r) + 1
2
π(C)Z2 − gN (C)Z
σ(Y σi )
)
,
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as well as ϕi (T ) = ϕ(Y σi (T )). In the above, ω denotes an element of the sample
space Ω where the probability P is defined, in order to stress the dependence of the
drift term with respect to the stochastic process Y σi . Let also (C1, Z1), (C2, Z2) be
solutions of the BSDE (36) when σ = σi , i = 1, 2. We can write (36) in integral form
Ci (s) = ϕi −
∫ T
s
f i (ω, v, C(v), Z(v))dv −
∫ T
s
Zi (v)dw(v).
Let us check that − f 1(ω, s, C2, Z2) ≤ − f 2(ω, s, C1, Z1). Note that there are two
terms that depend on i in the definition of f i : one is − gN (C)Z
σ(Y σi ) ; we have already
proved that σ(Y σ1) ≤ σ(Y σ2). Since σ is increasing, that Z ≥ 0 for all s P-a.s.,
and that gN (C) ≤ 0 (see Sect. 5), then − gN (C)σ (Y σ2 ) ≤ − gN (C)σ (Y σ1 ) . The other term is
F ′(Y σi ); since F is concave, F ′ is non-increasing, thus −F ′(Y σ1) ≤ −F ′(Y σ2).
Hence, − f 1(ω, s, C2, Z2) ≤ − f 2(ω, s, C1, Z1), as claimed. Now, the Comparison
Theorem 2.2 in Karoui et al. (1997) ensures that C1(s) ≤ C2(s) for all s, P-a.s.
Since the process Ci is deterministic at (t, x) and Ci (t) = φσ i (t, x), we have that
φσ1(t, x) ≤ φσ2(t, x) and the proof is finished.
Proof of Theorem 11
To show the result, we will use a representation of the MPNE by means of an FBSDE,
alternative to the KR rule introduced in Sect. 5, more amenable for our purposes. Let
the process Y that satisfies
dY = (F(Y ) + (σσ ′)(Y )) ds + σ(Y ) dω, Y (t) = x,
where we have omitted the argument s to shorten notation. Then, for C(s) =
φ(s, Y (s)) and the square-integrable adapted process (Z = σ(Y (s))φx (s, Y (s))),
where φ is a solution of the EL Eq. (10) we have, as in Sect. 6.4
dC(s) =
(
R(C(s))(F ′(Y (s)) − r) − 1
2
P(C(s))Z2(s) + gN (C(s))
σ (Y (s))
Z(s)
)
ds
+Z(s)dw(s),
and C(T ) = ϕ(Y (T )). Note that the process Z does not depend on the number of
players, N . Let
f N (ω, s, C, Z) = R(C)(F ′(Y (s)) − r) − 1
2
P(C)Z2 + gN (C)
σ (Y (s))
Z
be the drift term of the SDE of C when the number of players is N and let (C N , Z N )
be the corresponding solution. We have included ω ∈ Ω into the notation to stress
the dependence with respect to the process Y . We know that gN is negative thanks to
Assumption (A3) (a) (see also (12)). On the other hand, it is easy to see that gN , as a
function of N , is monotonous increasing if ρ(c) > 1 and decreasing if ρ(c) < 1. Let
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us suppose first that ρ(c) > 1. Given that Z ≥ 0 a.s. by Theorem 5, then gN1 (C)
σ
Z ≤
gN2 (C)
σ
Z a.s. if N1 ≤ N2. Hence − f N1(ω, s, C N2 , Z N2) ≤ − f N2(ω, s, C N2 , ξ N2),
as well as C N1(T ) = C N2(T ). According to the Comparison Theorem 2.2 of Karoui
et al. (1997), C N1(s) ≤ C N2(s) for all t ≤ s ≤ T , a.s. The case ρ(c) < 1 is
analyzed analogously. Since φNi (t, x) = C Ni (t) is deterministic, the theorem is
proved.
Proof of Theorem 12
We follow the same steps as in the proof of Theorem 11, using the same FBSDE
representation. The process Y is independent of the preference rate and the drift term
of the SDE of C in (A.6), f r , is decreasing in the preference rate. Hence r1 ≤ r2
implies − f r1 ≤ − f r2 and, by the Comparison Theorem 2.2 of Karoui et al. (1997),
we have the result.
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